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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Nicholas G Wood
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
June 2019
Title: Essays in Industrial Organization
I investigate the effect to which consumer heterogeneity impacts varying
markets. I find that it has a substantial effect all the markets that I consider.
In the US automobile industry, we model demand for the durable goods using
a dynamic model. We expand upon the current literature by allow households
the flexibility to select between different classes of vehicles. In further analysis, I
develop a method to incorporate microlevel data into the analysis of the automobile
industry. I show that, with this approach, national policy can be targeted at
specific groups and regions of the populous. For policies considering the automobile
industry, I consider the Cars Allowance Rebate System to evaluate policy effects.
Finally, I consider the boom of the U.S. smartphone industry. Using a random
coefficients estimator, I find that ignoring consumer specific effects would cause
the researcher to drastically misestimate gains, and therefor implement poor policy,
in the industry.
This dissertation includes previously unpublished co-authored material.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
There are millions of consumers, each with their own unique characteristics
that paricipate in numerous industries across the globe. It is our duty as
economists to understand how the interactions of a multitude of vastly different
consumers impact different markets in order to recommend effecive policies. This
dissertation proposes new means of modelling consumer behavior to better inform
policy. In Chapter II Keaton Miller, Wesley Wilson, and I examine policy in the
automobile industry. This chapter is co-authored with the above economists and is
currently unpublished.
Industrial policies are often sold to the public by appealing to multiple
constituencies which are often in opposition. For example, the 2009 Cash for
Clunkers program, which provided subsidies to consumers who chose to scrap
old automobiles and purchase new vehicles, was promoted under the trifecta of
ideas that the exchanges would reduce vehicle emissions, combat rising inequality,
and stimulate a troubled manufacturing sector. We evaluate the performance
of the policy against these stated goals. As vehicles are durable goods and the
policy differentiated between cars and light trucks, we introduce a dynamic,
partial equilibrium portfolio model with vertical product differentiation and
heterogeneous consumers. We calibrate the model to match data on new and used
car purchases from 1998-2011 and find that the program generated roughly $0.11 in
environmental savings per $1 in subsidies. Since subsidies largely went to middle-
income marginal consumers, the program exacerbated income inequality. By pulling
forward future truck purchases and incentivizing a switch to cars, the program
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resulted in small gains to automakers relative to the program’s budget. Our results
suggest that Cash for Clunkers and similar policies failed to achieve the trifecta.
The most famous vehicle exchange program in history, Cash for Clunkers,
ran during the summer of 2009. This program aimed reduce vehicle emissions
by removing older and larger vehicles, that were responsible for higher levels of
pollution than newer vehicles, from the population. In Chapter III, I develop a
structural model that incorporates microlevel data into the estimation procedure.
I do this by implementing two machine learning techniques: principle component
analysis and neural networks, to reduce the computational burden of including
demographic data into a structural model. With a micro-founded structural model,
I can examine how deviations in policy would have affected different demographic
groups or regions of the country by preforming counterfactual exercises.
Finally, in Chapter IV, I examine the smartphone industry. Over the last
decade, the modern smartphone has gone from luxury good, to an integral part
of our daily life. During this time, the marketplace has undergone rapid growth
and technological improvement. I apply a random coefficient model to measure the
welfare effects of the introduction of the smartphone and the resulting technological
progress. Using data on phone characteristics from 2010-2014, I find that the
average American benefited by $11.50 per year. This comes out to over $16 billion
in total consumer surplus over the sample period, making the smartphone industry
one of the largest generators of consumer welfare.
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CHAPTER II
STIMULUS, ENVIRONMENTALISM, AND INEQUALITY REDUCTION
THROUGH INDUSTRIAL POLICY: DID CASH FOR CLUNKERS ACHIEVE
THE TRIFECTA?
The contents of this chapter were developed by several members, including
Keaton Miller, Wesley Wilson, and myself. Keaton Miller and Wesley Wilson
contributed to this work by participating in the writing and formatting of final
draft that was sent out for publication, as well as providing guidance towards the
implementation of the economic analysis. I was the primary contributor toward
obtaining and modifying the data, solving the economic relations, and preforming
the computational analysis.
“[Cash for Clunkers] holds the promise of performing a remarkable
public policy trifecta – stimulating the economy, improving the
environment, and reducing income inequality all at the same time.”
(Blinder, 2008)
Introduction
Legislators often face a trade-off between policies designed to support
or stimulate industrial employment and productivity and policies designed to
promote environmental protection, as industrial activity generally leads directly to
environmental harms (Ayres and Kneese, 1969; Ma¨ler, 1974; Helfand et al., 2003).
Often, policymakers search for programs which can be promoted as “win-win” in
the sense that both the employment and environmental preferences of constituents
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and interest groups can reasonably be said to be satisfied (Becker, 1983; Aidt,
1998).
One class of policies designed to balance these concerns is “tied-scrappage”
programs, in which individuals are offered subsidies to scrap older, highly-polluting
durable goods and replace them with newer, more efficient models. For example,
the 2009 U.S. Cash for Clunkers program (hereafter C4C) offered consumers
who replaced personal automobiles (cars and light trucks) up to $4,500. Indeed,
C4C was promoted under not only employment and environmental rationales,
but also under the idea that the subsidies may allow low-income consumers to
purchase newer automobiles, thus reducing the purchasing-power impacts of income
inequality (Blinder, 2008). Tied scrappage programs have been implemented or
proposed in other jurisdictions as well (The Economist, 2009): one program in
Germany has led to over a million new vehicle registrations (Bo¨ckers et al., 2012;
Gu¨rtler et al., 2016), and India’s government has proposed a program designed to
take 28 million vehicles off of the road starting in 2020 (PTI, 2018).
In this paper, we evaluate C4C against these multiple goals. The degree to
which any tied-scrappage program is able to realize equality, environmental, or
stimulus benefits depends in part on the mix of consumers who receive subsidies,
the realized environmental differences between the scrapped and new goods, and,
since these goods are durable, the counterfactual sequence of purchases which
would have taken place if the subsidies were not available. In particular, C4C
offered the highest subsidies to consumers who replaced trucks with cars. As trucks
generally emit a greater amount of carbon dioxide per mile travelled than cars,
these trades may be particularly environmentally friendly on a mile-for-mile basis.
However, as trucks have higher prices than cars, substitution between a future
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purchase of a truck and a present purchase of a car may represent lost present value
to a risk-neutral firm.
Understanding these intertemporal linkages is crucial to evaluating the
impacts of C4C and thus we develop a dynamic model of portfolio choice. In the
model, consumers are differentiated by income and tastes, and choose a portfolio
of (potentially multiple) vehicles to own. Vehicles are vertically differentiated by
age and horizontally differentiated across cars and trucks. We calibrate the model
to match data on new and used vehicle purchases from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey from 1998-2011. We capture the impact of the 2009 program by simulating
the sequence of purchases from 2009 onward both with and without subsidies.
We find C4C generated $317 million in environmental benefits through
reduced CO2 emissions from travel under a budget of $3 billion. By pulling
forward vehicle purchases and encouraging substitution from trucks to cars, the
program induced $8.7 billion of additional private expenditures during its lifespan,
but reduced private expenditures on automobiles in the five years following its
expiration by $5.5 billion. We find the program also had negative consequences
for inequality. Most consumers participating in the program were consumers who
would have purchased a vehicle in the next five years even without the subsidies.
Therefore, from the perspective of the “inside share” of vehicles, the subsidies
largely went to infra-marginal consumers, who are generally of medium-to-high
income.
Our framework allows us to consider alternative designs for the C4C program.
We find that focusing on the incentive to trade in trucks for cars could increase
the environmental benefit by up to 30%, but at the cost of exacerbating the
other tradeoffs of the program. Focusing on immediate stimulus, an alternative
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program design could increase consumer spending to $12.8 billion with similar
tradeoffs. However, we are unable to find a version of the policy which successfully
accomplishes the “policy trifecta” of simultaneously reducing inequality,
environmental improvements, and incentivizing increased spending.
Our work builds upon the literature examining interactions between primary
and secondary markets both with and without transaction costs (Rust, 1985;
Stolyarov, 2002). Gavazza et al. (2014), hereafter GLR, introduce a dynamic model
of the used car market which allows for variable transaction costs. Barahona et al.
(2015) apply the GLR model to show that Chile’s day-of-week driving restrictions
increase fleet turnover. In a working paper, Quan and Singer (2015) use the model
to compare the ‘tied subsidy’ design of C4C to a simple subsidy design (in which
no scrappage is required) and find the C4C mechanism design is an improvement
over the simple subsidy with respect to environmental goals. Gavazza and Lanteri
(2018) extend the model to incorporate aggregate credit shocks and show that such
shocks affect the vehicle market by flowing through the decisions of households
of different income levels who play different roles within the secondary market.
Relative to these other papers, we allow for horizontal, as well as vertical, product
differentiation and corresponding heterogeneity in preferences for vehicle portfolios
across households.
Our work also contributes to the literature studying the tradeoffs between the
automobile industry and environmental conditions. Berry et al. (1996) estimate
a hedonic marginal cost function and find that tightened emissions standards
significantly increased the cost of automobile production. Munk-Nielsen (2015)
analyzes tax policies around diesel automobiles in Denmark with a model where
households decide both which vehicles to purchase and how much to drive. He
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finds that re-optimizations along both margins in response to changes in policy
imply that emissions reductions programs may be less effective than they might
seem. Knittel et al. (2016) use data from California to show that the ambient
air pollution generated by automobile congestion significantly increases infant
mortality rates, particularly for premature or low birth-weight infants.
In addition to the work mentioned above, C4C has received considerable
attention from other perspectives. Mian and Sufi (2012) and Li et al. (2013)
examine consumer decisions using difference-in-differences frameworks and find
that most of the participants would have purchased a new car in the immediate
future even in the absence of the program. Hoekstra et al. (ming) use a regression
discontinuity design to show that more than half of the subsidies went to
households who would have purchased even without the program. Copeland and
Kahn (2011) consider vehicle production and that almost all C4C sales came
from previously overstocked inventories, implying that the program may not
have induced any new production. Abrams and Parsons (2009) estimates the
environmental benefits from the program under the assumption that traded-in
vehicles would have remained on the road for three more years. They estimate a
benefit of $600 per vehicle, which is much less than the total subsidy. Lenski et al.
(2010) find that the estimated cost of a metric-ton reduction of greenhouse gas
under the program was about $600, which is significantly larger than the EPA’s
$13 estimate of the cost of CO2 reduction through more direct channels. Li and
Wei (2013) evaluate the tradeoff between the stimulus and environmental objectives
with a focus on the range of vehicles purchased under the program, as opposed to
our focus on multi-vehicle households and the interplay between the primary and
secondary markets. Relative to this literature, we make two primary contributions.
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First, we focus on the horizontal differentiation between cars and trucks which is
relevant due to the specific design of C4C. Second, instead of focusing on any single
policy goal, we develop and apply a framework that captures each of the stated
policy goals in a consistent way.
We proceed by providing details on the C4C program and our data in
Section 2.2. Section 2.3 introduces our model of dynamic vehicle portfolio choice.
We calibrate the model to the data on the U.S. primary and secondary automobile
industry in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 we present our evaluation of C4C through
counterfactual exercises. Section 2.6 concludes.
The Cash for Clunkers Program
The Cars Allowance Rebate System, also known as Cash for Clunkers (C4C),
was introduced by the United States federal government in 2009, and ran from
July through August of that year. C4C offered participants a credit for scrapping
their old vehicle when buying a new vehicle under certain conditions. Only vehicles
with a combined city/highway miles-per-gallon (MPG) rating of 18 or fewer, as
measured by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), were eligible to trade-in
for scrap. If the new vehicle purchased had an EPA combined rating of at least 4
MPG higher than the trade-in, participants would receive a $3,500 credit. If the
new vehicle represented an improvement of 10 MPG or greater, the credit increased
to $4,500.1
These thresholds were modified for owners of trucks. Consumers trading in
light-duty trucks needed only to purchase a new vehicle with a two MPG rating
improvement and were eligible for the increased credit with an improvement of
1Consumers could view these rules via a government website, archived via: https://web.
archive.org/web/20100101064549/http://www.cars.gov/faq
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only five MPG.2 Given the option set in the new vehicle market in 2009, these
thresholds made it almost impossible to receive the large credit while trading in
an old car for a new truck. Conversely, it was almost guaranteed that participants
would be eligible for the large credit it they traded in a truck for a new car. These
features underscore the need for a model of differentiated choice between the
categories of cars and trucks.
The program was originally signed into law as part of the Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 2009 and began on July 1. Congress initially appropriated
$1 billion for the program, though funds were nearly exhausted by July 30. An
additional $2 billion was appropriated by August 7. All funds were spent by
August 24 (Bunkley, 2009).
To understand the direct impact of C4C in terms of trade-ins and purchases,
we obtain data on the program from the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration (NHTSA). The NHTSA data covers all trade-ins and new-vehicle
purchases related to the Cash for Clunkers program. An observation in this data is
a vehicle model and type, with data provided on the number of times the vehicle
was traded-in or purchased (if it was new in 2009) as part of the program, as well
as other descriptors of the vehicle. Summary statistics for the program are in Table
1 below. The first column summarizes the data for models classified as “cars,” and
the second column summarizes the data on “truck” models. Trucks consisted of
roughly 85% of the vehicles traded-in, but only 41% of the vehicles purchased. This
suggests that the program generated substitution from trucks to cars.
2There were slight differences between the thresholds for light-duty (e.g. GMC Sierra 1500),
medium-duty (e.g. Ram 3500), and heavy-duty (e.g. Ford F-750) trucks. As light-duty trucks
comprised roughly 80% of the trucks traded-in and purchased under the program, we abstract
away from differences within the truck category.
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TABLE 1.
Cash for Clunkers Summary Statistics by Vehicle Type
Cars Trucks
Trade-ins 102,638 574,443
New Vehicles 397,182 279,899
Average Trade-in MPG 17.5 15.5
Average New Vehicle MPG 27.9 20.7
Average Age of Trade-ins (years) 16.6 15.5
Notes: Data from National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. MPG is the EPA combined
highway/city rating.
While these data are illustrative, they must be placed in the context of the
steady-state pattern of vehicle purchase, ownership, and replacement decisions by
U.S. households. To capture these patterns, we obtain data from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX). The CEX is a publicly available rolling-panel interview
survey conducted every quarter by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and contains
detailed data on American household characteristics, consumption habits, and
vehicle holdings.
We collect the CEX survey responses from 1996-2011. We use the Q1 sample
of each year. We observe the number of vehicles owned, and the age and price paid
for each. The data are summarized in Figure 1 for the truck and car vehicle types.
Panel (a) reports the stock of vehicles by vintage, normalized to the number of new
cars purchased by households in the original model year. The stock temporarily
rises above one as commercial vehicles (e.g. rental fleets) are sold to households.
This effect is more prominent for cars than trucks. Panel (b) reports the average
price of cars by vintage. Trucks are more expensive than cars, but both depreciate
at roughly the same rate.
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FIGURE 1.
Distributions of Vehicle Stocks and Prices by Age
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Notes: Data from Consumer Expenditure Survey, 1996-2011 Q1 sample. Points denote sample
averages, lines are best-fit 5th-order polynomials. Age refers to years since model year.
Model
Our dynamic partial equilibrium model of vehicle purchase, ownership, and
resale has features that are similar to the approach of GLR but includes horizontal
differentiation between vehicles. There is a measure of infinitely-lived households
denoted by i with common discount factor β, each of which may own up to two
vehicles. Each vehicle has a type m ∈ {C, T, 0}, denoting cars, trucks, and no
vehicle, respectively. Vehicles also have a vintage a ∈ Z with 0 ≤ a < A∗ where
0 represents the most recent vintage and A∗ is the last vintage in the stock of
vehicles.3
Households enter each period t with a mix of zero, one, or two vehicles of
different ages. They earn constant income yi drawn from a log-normal distribution
with mean µy and variance σy. Households incur operating costs C
m×m that
3Imposing a finite A∗ implies that all vehicles are scrapped once they reach a certain age and
allows us to ignore vehicles which make up a minuscule portion of the fleet.
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depend on the mix of vehicles they own that period. They receive flow utility from
their vehicles and may participate in the primary or secondary vehicle markets.
After purchasing and/or selling vehicles, they receive log utility from their net
income, and enter the next period with their updated vehicle inventory.
To construct the flow utility from vehicle ownership, we let qma be the quality
of each vehicle. As this quality is fully flexible across vehicle types and ages, we
can without loss of generality set the marginal utility of owning a single vehicle
with respect to that vehicle’s quality to one. Households that own two vehicles
receive utility from the quality of both. Without loss of generality, we defined the
“second” vehicle as the vehicle which is older (i.e. the vehicle with a higher a).
To allow for differences in vehicle usage patterns across vehicle inventories, we
allow for the possibility that the marginal utility of a second vehicle may differ
from the (normalized) marginal utility of the first vehicle. Furthermore, to allow
for differences in usage patterns across households, we allow households to differ
in their marginal utility of second vehicle ownership by the type of the vehicle.
Let γiT be the marginal utility coming from the quality of a second truck when
the household already has a truck and let γiC analogously be the marginal utility
coming from the quality of a second car. Let γi be the marginal utility of the
second vehicle’s quality when the two vehicles are of different types. Let m and
n be the types of the two vehicles and let a and b be the ages of the two vehicles.
The flow utility of vehicle ownership is therefore time-invariant and can be written
as
12
ui(m,n, a, b) = (2.1)
0 if m = 0
qma if m 6= 0, n = 0
qma + q
n
b (γiT1
{m=n=T} + γiC1{m=n=C} + γi1{m 6=n}) if m 6= 0, n 6= 0
In each period, households may participate in the vehicle market by
purchasing a new vehicle, selling an old vehicle, or both. We take vehicle markets
to be competitive in the sense that in each period households observe a schedule
of vehicle prices that vary by type and age {pma } and take those prices as given.
Households which sell a vehicle in the secondary market incur a transaction cost
that may vary with the price of the vehicle. We define the effective re-sale price of
a vehicle via Ψ(p) = ψ0 + ψ1p. For simplicity, we allow households to purchase
and/or sell only one vehicle in each period.
We now have nearly all the ingredients needed to write household i’s recursive
value function. For ease of notation, we re-frame the household’s choice problem in
terms of choosing a portfolio of vehicle types and vintages to own tomorrow, where
the cost of transitioning between portfolios depends on the household’s current
inventory. Let R(m′, n′, a′, b′;m,n, a, b) be the revenue (or cost) which comes from
transitioning from portfolio (m,n, a, b) to portfolio (m′, n′, a′, b′). There are fourteen
possible ways in which a household can interact with the market and update its
portfolio based on their current state. We therefore define R(·) piecewise via
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R(m′, n′, a′, b′;m,n, a, b) = (2.2)
0 if m = n = m′ = n′ = 0
0 if m′ = m, a′ = a+ a, n′ = n = 0
0 if m′ = m,n′ = n, a′ = a+ 1, b′ = b+ 1
Ψ(pma ) if m
′ = n′ = n = 0,m 6= 0
Ψ(pma ) if m
′ = n, n′ = 0, a′ = b+ 1
Ψ(pnb ) if m
′ = m,n′ = 0, a′ = a+ 1
−pm′a′ if m = n = n′ = 0,m′ 6= 0
−pn′b′ if n = 0, n′ 6= 0,m′ = m, a′ = a+ 1
−pm′a′ if n′ = m, b′ = a+ 1, n = 0,m′ 6= 0
Ψ(pma )− pm′a′ if ¬(m′ = m, a′ = a+ 1),m′ 6= 0,m 6= 0, n = 0
Ψ(pma )− pm′a′ if a′ ≤ b′, n′ = n, b′ = b+ 1,¬(m′ = m, a′ = a+ 1)
Ψ(pnb )− pn′b′ if a′ ≤ b′,m′ = m, a′ = a+ 1,¬(n′ = n, b′ = b+ 1)
Ψ(pma )− pn′b′ if a′ ≤ b′, a′ = b+ 1,m′ = n, n′ 6= 0
Ψ(pnb )− pm′a′ if a′ ≤ b′, n′ = m, b′ = a+ 1,m′ 6= 0
−∞ else
In this equation, the first case occurs when the household owns no vehicles
and does not participate in the vehicle market. The second and third cases occur
when the household allows their vehicle(s) to age without buying or selling. The
fourth case occurs when a single vehicle household sells their only vehicle. The
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fifth and sixth cases occur when a two vehicle household sells their newer or order
vehicle, respectively. The seventh case occurs when the household buys a first
vehicle and the eighth case represents the household buying a second vehicle that is
older than their first. The ninth case captures households who buy a second vehicle
which is younger than the first at the time of purchase so that the first vehicle
becomes the second vehicle in the ordering of the model. The tenth case occurs
when a household with a single vehicle trades it in for a new one. The eleventh
and twelfth cases occur when a household replaces their first or second vehicle,
respectively, while maintaining the order between them. The thirteenth case occurs
when households sell their first vehicle and buy a vehicle that is older than their
current second vehicle, and the fourteenth case captures the converse; a household
which sells its second vehicle and buys a vehicle which is newer than their current
first vehicle. All other portfolio choices involve transactions over more than one
vehicle and are assumed to be impossible.
With R(·) in hand, we can write the recursive value function as
Vi(m,n, a, b) = ui(m,n, a, b) (2.3)
+ max
m′,n′,a′,b′
[ln (yi − Cm,n +R(m′, n′, a′, b′; ·)) + βVi(m′, n′, a′, b′)] .
Steady State Equilibrium
Quan and Singer (2015) show that if transaction costs are sufficiently high,
households can be separated into groups which differ in the number and types
of vehicles owned. Within a group, households choose to trade-in and purchase
replacement vehicles in such a way to maintain their number-type portfolio (though
the vintages may be different). We therefore focus on a steady-state equilibrium for
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the purposes of solving the model and recovering parameters from the data, and
introduce C4C in Section 2.5 as an unforeseen temporary shock.
Let hma (i) be the number of vehicles of type m and age a owned by household
i, and xma be the stock of vehicles, determined exogenously. Given the set of
vehicle stocks and qualities as well as the distribution of household preferences, an
equilibrium is a set of decision rules for each household {m∗i , n∗i , a∗i , b∗i } and prices
pma such that the decision rules solve the maximization problem of Equation 2.3 and
markets clear: ∫
hma (i)di = x
m
a ∀a,m (2.4)
We adopt this partial equilibrium setting due to the complexity of modeling
general equilibrium in the primary market for vehicles, particularly in a setting
where manufacturers are forward-looking. Furthermore, as seen in Figure 1, the
stock of vehicles owned by households is increasing in the vintage in the first few
years, indicating that a general equilibrium model of the secondary market would
need to consider the decisions of commercial fleet owners to resell their vehicles.
Finally, as the C4C program as implemented influenced a small number of vehicle
purchases – approximately 677,000 – relative to the size of the primary market –
10.4 million in 2009 according to an industry group (NIADA, 2017) – it is unlikely
that manufacturing or commercial fleet decisions would be altered by the presence
of the program. Indeed, Copeland and Kahn (2011) conclude that the program in
the U.S. may not have induced new production. Furthermore, Gu¨rtler et al. (2016)
studied a similar program in Germany that affected over two-thirds of new vehicles
purchases in that year and found that the price of used vehicles only rose by 6%.
Separating households into groups allows us to characterize the decision
problems of those groups independently. Since households play a repeated pattern
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of purchasing vehicles of a certain vintage, holding them until they age a certain
amount, and then replacing them with another vehicle of the original vintage, the
recursive value function for each household type, and therefore the maximization
problem for consumers, can be rewritten in a non-recursive form. For example,
households which own a single car follow decision rules that can be represented
as {a˜i, b˜i}C , where a˜i is the vintage of car that the household purchases when
it decides to trade-in its current vehicle, and b˜i is vintage at which the trade-in
occurs. In steady state, the household’s value function can be rewritten in the form
of these decision rules with
V C(y) = max
a,b
qCa + ln(y − pCa − CC)+ (2.5)
1
1− βb−a+1
[
b−a∑
j=1
βj[qCa+j + ln(y − CC)] + βb−a+1
[
qCa + ln(y − pCa + Ψ(pCb )− CC)
] ]
.
These reformulations of the value function allow us to reduce computational
effort as instead of computing a recursive value function through e.g. value function
iteration, we can directly solve for the decision rules as a function of the qualities
and prices of the relevant vehicles and then test the market clearing condition.4
Calibration
To evaluate C4C, we must first fit the model to the steady-state vehicle
portfolio equilibrium in the data. We calibrate some of the parameters directly
4The non-recursive value function for two-vehicle households is considerably messier and
more difficult to compute. To reduce the computational burden, we restrict one-car, one-truck
households to replace their vehicles at the same age (e.g. their car is replaced when it reaches age
15, and their truck is replaced when it reaches age 15). As we allow households to re-optimize if
they participate in C4C (see Section 2.5), this simplification should not qualitatively affect the
results.
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from the data and literature, and solve for the rest through matching the model’s
output to the data. Table 2 summarizes the model parameters. We proceed by
detailing each of these parameters.
TABLE 2.
Summary of Model Parameters and Values
Variable Description Value
β Discount rate .95
µy Mean of household income distribution 10.5
σy Variance of household income 1.06
A∗ Maximum vehicle age 20
xma Vehicle stock by age and type See Figure 1
pma Vehicle prices by age and type See Figure 1
Cm×m Vehicle operating cost See Table 3
ψ0 Constant transaction cost -624 (see Figure 2)
ψ1 Proportional transaction cost 0.83 (see Figure 2)
qma Vehicle quality by age and type Solved for below
γiT Distribution of marginal utility of trucks
}
Solved for belowγiC Distribution of marginal utility of cars
γi Distribution of marginal utility of variety
We set the yearly household discount rate β to 0.95 (Gavazza et al., 2014),
and calibrate the log-normal income distribution from the CEX data to µy = 10.5
and σy = 1.06. Figure 1 shows the stock of vehicles falls below 1% of its original
value after 20 years, and so we set the maximum age of vehicles, A∗, to 20. We also
use the CEX data as seen in Figure 1 to calibrate the stock and price of vehicles for
each age and type.
Operating costs Cm×m are the sum of the vehicle maintenance, registration,
and fuel costs incurred by households and vary by the household’s vehicle portfolio
of vehicle types. Table 3 summarizes the median annualized operating costs
captured by the CEX in Q1 of 2009 by household type.
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TABLE 3.
Annualized Vehicle Operating Costs by Vehicle Portfolio Type
Portfolio Obs. Operating Cost ($)
No Vehicles 442 0
One Car 777 1,200
One Truck 435 1,760
Two Trucks 360 2,840
Two Cars 403 2,332
One of Each 1,176 2,520
Notes: Data from Q1 CEX 2009. Operating costs are in 2009 dollars and are annualized from
median quarterly measure.
To calibrate the transaction cost function Ψ(p), we obtain data from the
Kelly Blue Book (KBB), July-September 2009 edition. KBB reports prices of used
vehicles which were originally produced from 1994-2008. We observe four different
values for each vehicle: the trade-in value for vehicles in fair condition; the trade-in
value for vehicles in good condition; the private-property value of vehicles in good
condition; and the retail value of vehicles in excellent condition. Following (Quan
and Singer, 2015), we regress the trade-in value of vehicles in good condition on the
private-property value for vehicles in good condition to estimate the parameters
ψ0 and ψ1. We limit the observations used in this regression to those models for
which we observe at least 250 trade-ins as part of C4C. The data and estimated
function are displayed in Figure 2. The results show that a linear fit is a reasonable
approximation to the difference between the value of a vehicle and what a consumer
can expect to receive when trading that vehicle in. This relationship extends to
both extremes of the distribution of vehicle values.5
5We also experimented with varying transaction costs by vehicle type and found nearly
identical results.
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FIGURE 2.
Estimated Transaction Costs from Kelley Blue Book
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Note: The horizontal axis is the private-property value of a vehicle of a specific model-year in
good condition. The vertical axis is the trade-in value of the same model-year in good condition.
The difference, therefore, is the effective transaction cost for that model-year. Each dot represents
a model-year observation that had at least 250 trade-ins as part of the program.
The remaining parameters capture vehicle quality by age and type, and the
distribution of marginal utilities for second vehicles across households. We set these
parameters by solving the model and matching the stock of vehicles xma and the
relative frequencies of the household types in Table 2.
Since γiT , γiC , and γi capture the marginal utility of a second vehicle, it
is reasonable to assume that they should be drawn from a distribution with
support between zero and one. The NHTSA data imply that the C4C program
successfully incentivized consumers to switch their portfolio of vehicle types, which
implies that there may be some correlated between the values of γT , γC , and γ
for a given household. Though we have six moments to match – the six types of
households seen in Table 3 – we have only three degrees of freedom as the relative
frequencies must sum to one, and the sum of the households with different vehicle
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portfolios must match the number of cars and trucks in the stock. To pin down
three potentially correlated distributions with three free parameters, we use
γiT ∼ Beta(.5, βT ), γiC = γiT + εC , γ = γT + ε; (2.6)
εC ∼ Exp(λC), ε ∼ Exp(λ).
This specification roughly imposes the assumption that marginal utilities are
between zero and one. The support of the Beta distribution is the interval (0, 1),
so draws of γiT fall in this range with probability 1. Draws of γiC and γi will fall in
the same range with some probability that depends on the magnitudes of λc and
λ.6 The degree of correlation depends on the magnitude of λc and λ. If the means
of the shocks are quite low, the degree of correlation is high, and γc, and γ should
almost always remain smaller than one.
With this specification in mind, we match the data via a nested fixed point
algorithm. In the inner loop, we take the parameters {βT , λC , λ} as given and solve
for the schedule of vehicle qualities qma to match the stocks in the data. We do so
by starting with a guess of the qualities, solving for the optimal portfolio decision
rules m∗, n∗, a∗, b∗, and aggregating over the households to find the stock of each
vehicle predicted by the model.7 We then adjust the qualities in the direction
of the difference between the stock in the data and the model-predicted stocks.
In the outer loop, after solving for the qualities, we aggregate the households by
vehicle type portfolios and compare the model-predicted portfolio shares to the
relative frequencies in the data as represented in Table 3. We calculate the distance
6At the estimated values, the probability of the γ draws falling outside of the interval (0, 1) is
close to zero. As a consequence, our choice of γiT as the ‘baseline’ preference is not likely to affect
the results.
7We use 5,000 household draws and integrate-through-simulation.
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between these vectors and use the Nelder-Mead hill-climbing procedure (Nelder and
Mead, 1965) to find the parameters {βT , λC , λ} that minimizes this distance.
The results can be seen in Figure 3. Panel (a) plots the densities of the γi
terms under the parameters found through the procedure above: βt = 1.06, λc =
17.24, λ = 13.69. Because the estimated value of the variety parameter is lower
than that of the preference for a second car, the average consumer has a stronger
preference for variety (the second vehicle being different than the first) than
either a second car or truck. The associated qualities that form the steady-state
equilibrium from these γi terms are shown in Panel (b) of the Figure. The qualities
are decreasing in vintage; trucks have a higher quality than cars of the same age.
FIGURE 3.
Estimated Household Preferences and Vehicle Qualities
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To evaluate the fit of the model, we examine the extent to which the model
matches moments from the CEX data which were not used to calibrate parameters.
In particular, we examine the rate at which households with different income
levels select different types of vehicle ownership. The results from this exercise
can be found in Table 4. In general, the model captures the relative share of each
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portfolio type well. The main difference comes from the existence of a cutoff point
in the income distribution, below which zero households participate in the vehicle
market and above which all households participate in the vehicle market. While the
percentage of households with zero vehicles is declining in income in the data, the
pattern is not as extreme as predicted by the model.
TABLE 4.
Household Vehicle Type Portfolios by Income Quartile,
Model-Predicted and CEX Averages
Income Zero One Two Two One
Quartile Vehicles Vehicle Trucks Cars Each
Lowest
53.8% 34.4% 2.3% 0.4% 9.1%
37.1% 43.2% 3.2% 5.6% 10.9%
Mid-Low
0.0% 49.4% 15.9% 5.8% 28.9%
14.2% 48.4% 6.5% 8.5% 22.4%
Mid-High
0.0% 30.9% 9.7% 15.4% 44.0%
7.9% 28.9% 11.9% 13.8% 38.0%
Highest
0.0% 14.1% 12.7% 17.9% 55.2%
0.3% 14.7% 16.5% 15.9% 52.6%
Notes: Model-predicted values are reported first; values from
the data are reported underneath.
Evaluating Cash for Clunkers
With the steady-state equilibrium in hand, we now turn to evaluating the
C4C program and other programs in a similar vein. We model C4C as a one-time
shock in which certain eligible households receive a subsidy if they trade-in their
vehicle and purchase a new one. Vehicles in the model differ only by type and
vintage; C4C required a certain MPG for eligibility. To determine who is eligible
for the program, we assume the trade-in’s MPG is exogenously determined and
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probabilistically assign an MPG rating to the household’s oldest vehicle based on
EPA MPG estimates for vehicles of that vintage.
To determine which households participate in the program, we must first
calculate the subsidy available to each household. Unlike the trade-in’s MPG, the
MPG of the purchased vehicle is clearly endogenous to the household’s decision
of whether to participate and which vehicle to buy, based on the credit received.
Our model does not differentiate between new vehicles of different MPG ratings
and so it is not possible to determine the size of the credit received. The data
provided by the NHTSA shows that roughly three-quarters of households received
the $4,500 credit and so therefore we set the subsidy received by all households to
the maximum credit of $4,500.
As households in the steady-state equilibrium follow a path that fixes the
vehicle type portfolio, we determine participation rates separately for households
with different portfolio holdings. For eligible households with a single vehicle of
vintage a, we allow the household to stay on its equilibrium path or trade-in the
vehicle while purchasing a new vehicle. If the household elects to participate, it
re-optimizes its future purchasing and holding behavior. Since C4C is a one-time
shock to the effective value of trade-ins, the household will thereafter follow a new
steady-state equilibrium path.
A household with two vehicles of vintages (a, b), where b > a, may choose
to stay on its current path or it may elect to trade in its oldest vehicle for either
a new car or new truck while receiving the credit. If the household elects to
participate, the vintages of its vehicles update and it re-optimizes over its future
decisions. As with single-vehicle households, the one-time nature of C4C ensures
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that the household will follow a (potentially different) steady-state equilibrium path
once the participation decision is made.
We simulate the impact of the C4C policy as implemented by Congress
and find that 89.6% of trade-ins were trucks, quite close to the 85% reported by
NHTSA. Transactions in which trucks are traded-in for cars account for 53.8% of
all transactions in the model. This amount is almost equivalent to the 51.8% from
the actual program. These results give us additional confidence that our model
successfully captures the relevant incentives, particularly as we did not use any
information from the C4C program to pin down the parameters of the model.
As our model allows us to simulate any tied-scrappage program, we present
results below with respect to a number of variations on the C4C policy design in
additional to the program as implemented. We focus on variations that change
the incentives to switch between vehicle types, and allow the rebate from trading
in a truck for a car to vary between $2,500, $4,500, and $6,500. We consider
only policies where switching to a car is at least as rewarding as the alternative.8
Throughout our analyses, we maintain the $3 billion subsidy budget appropriated
by Congress.9
We begin our analysis by exploring the behavior of households under different
program designs. Table 5 reports participation rates. The top number of each
entry reports the percentage of U.S. households electing to participate, and the
8As we do not model the details of the new vehicle market, we are unable to explore
alternative specifications of tiered subsidies based on MPG improvements.
9We do find that more consumers wish to participate in the program than can be
accommodated by this budget. For example, under the C4C policy, we find that 4.8% of all
households would have opted to participate in the program, which is an order of magnitude
larger than the 0.58% of U.S. households who were able to participate. Given the speed as which
the appropriation was spent, this result is reasonable. We allow households to participate with
uniform probability.
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bottom number reports the share of participating households which would not have
purchased a vehicle in the year of the policy without the subsidy – in other words,
the share of marginal consumers as opposed to inframarginal consumers which
would have purchased a vehicle without the subsidy. Both the overall and marginal
participation rates increase both in the subsidy amount and in the looseness of
trade-in MPG requirement as more households become eligible. However, the
highest marginal participation rates occur when the subsidy rate for truck-to-car
transactions is higher than the the subsidy rate for other transactions.
TABLE 5.
Overall and Marginal Participation in Cash for Clunkers and Alternative Policies
Subsidy Amount Trade-in MPG Requirement
Truck → Car All Others 16 17 18 19 20
$2,500 $2,500
0.06 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.18
29.7 35.7 36.0 38.5 37.2
$4,500 $2,500
0.26 0.33 0.43 0.51 0.62
51.4 53.0 53.4 54.5 52.6
$4,500 $4,500
0.55 0.74 0.95 1.14 1.38
38.3 38.9 40.9 42.3 44.0
$6,500 $2,500
1.58 2.17 2.73 3.2 3.66
62.5 62.0 62.3 62.7 62.4
$6,500 $4,500
1.87 2.57 3.24 3.82 4.41
56.8 56.4 57.1 57.7 58.0
$6,500 $6,500
2.3 3.15 4.04 4.85 5.8
55.0 54.4 55.1 55.3 55.6
Notes: For each row-cell combination, the top number is the
percentage of households willing to trade-in a vehicle under the
policy. The bottom number is the percentage of trade-ins which
would not have happened without the policy – in other words the
share of new vehicle purchases which are marginal. The Cash for
Clunkers policy is in bold.
26
We detail this substitution behavior in Table 6, which reports the percentage
of participants who trade-in a a truck for a car. When the subsidy rate is low, less
than 20% of the transactions involve a change in vehicle type. When the subsidy
for truck-to-car transactions is raised above other transaction types, the share of
these transactions increases to as high as 97%.
TABLE 6.
Percentage of Participants Substituting from Trucks to Cars
Subsidy Amount Trade-in MPG Requirement
Truck → Car All Others 16 17 18 19 20
$2,500 $2,500 12.5 14.3 15.3 18.5 18.9
$4,500 $2,500 78.2 78.2 78.2 78.4 76.4
$4,500 $4,500 36.3 34.8 35.2 35.1 34.2
$6,500 $2,500 96.5 96.7 96.6 96.6 96.0
$6,500 $4,500 81.4 81.4 81.0 80.8 79.6
$6,500 $6,500 65.1 65.5 64.2 62.7 59.8
Notes: The Cash for Clunkers policy is in bold.
Short-Term and Long-Term Stimulus
To investigate the extent to which C4C was effective at stimulating spending
in the automotive sector, we compare spending on new vehicle purchases in 2009
in our steady-state equilibrium to spending in 2009 under the C4C program rules.
The results are presented in Table 7. C4C generated $8.70 billion in additional
consumer expenditures over what would have occurred in 2009. Given the $3
billion budget, we conclude that a marginal dollar spent on C4C generates $2.9
in additional spending. The alternative designs explored in Table 7 reveal that
increasing the size of the subsidy results in a smaller stimulus effect, even though
the percentage of purchases which are marginal increases per Table 5, due to the
decreased number of transactions which can be subsidized.
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TABLE 7.
Additional Spending in 2009 Under Cash For Clunkers and Alternative Policies ($ billion)
Subsidy Amount Trade-in MPG Requirement
Truck → Car All Others 16 17 18 19 20
$2,500 $2,500 10.1 13.6 12.83 11.42 10.4
$4,500 $2,500 7.29 7.38 7.51 7.65 7.84
$4,500 $4,500 8.59 8.78 8.70 8.40 8.12
$6,500 $2,500 5.13 5.08 5.10 5.18 5.25
$6,500 $4,500 5.17 5.14 5.17 5.23 5.28
$6,500 $6,500 5.36 5.28 5.24 5.20 5.14
Notes: The table above depicts expenditures in the new vehicle
market in 2009 under the policy relative to expenditures without
the policy. Expenditures are measured in billions of 2009 dollars.
The Cash for Clunkers policy is in bold. The optimal policy by this
metric is in italics.
While these short-term effects may seem considerable, many of the marginal
households may have planned to replace their vehicle in the next year or two. In
this case, C4C may have acted to simply ‘pull-forward’ future spending rather than
inspire truly new consumption in the vehicle market. To examine this possibility,
we take advantage of the dynamic nature of our model, which allows households
which participate in C4C to re-optimize their future actions in the primary and
secondary vehicle markets. As above, we compare spending in 2009 and each
following year under the steady-state equilibrium to the time-series of spending
under the C4C program. Figure 4 illustrates the results. In 2009, C4C generates
nearly $14,000 per participating household. However, this is significantly offset by
a reduction in 2010 of nearly $5,000 per household. Indeed, relative to a world in
which C4C did not occur, participating households reduced their spending on new
vehicles until 2017, when households begin to replace the vehicles they purchased
under C4C en masse.
We summarize these offsetting effects in Table 8 by computing the discounted
sum of additional spending under C4C assuming an annual discount rate of 5%.
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FIGURE 4.
The Effect of Cash For Clunkers on Future Spending
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We find that, over the time series, C4C generated only $925 million in additional
spending – a marginal stimulus effect of merely $0.31 per dollar spent. Increasing
the size of the subsidy to $6,500 results in a negative stimulus effect, as the
spending that is pulled-forward is never fully recovered.
Carbon emissions reductions
To calculate the environmental impact of the program, we compare the
portfolio holdings of households across the steady-state equilibrium to the holdings
after C4C occurs. We aggregate over households to obtain a measure of the net
emissions savings, using the differences in the EPA estimated MPG by vehicle
type and vintage. We adopt the EPA standard estimates that the average vehicle
is driven 11,400 miles per year, and that consumption a gallon of gas leads to
8,887 grams of CO2 emitted.
10 Finally, we use a EPA estimates of the social
10See EPA website
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TABLE 8.
Discounted Long-Run Additional Spending Under Cash For Clunkers and Alternative
Policies ($ million)
Subsidy Amount Trade-in MPG Requirement
Truck → Car All Others 16 17 18 19 20
$2,500 $2,500 1,145 2,240 2,361 2,203 2,040
$4,500 $2,500 757 767 795 972 1,096
$4,500 $4,500 913 997 925 870 809
$6,500 $2,500 -786 -824 -790 -711 -654
$6,500 $4,500 -917 -938 -904 -838 -781
$6,500 $6,500 -810 -852 -841 -802 -764
Notes: The table above depicts expenditures in the new vehicle market
over the long run under the policy relative to expenditures without
the policy. Expenditures are measured in millions of 2009 dollars; the
annual discount rate is 5%. The Cash for Clunkers policy is in bold. The
optimal policy by this metric is in italics.
cost of carbon emissions to convert our CO2 estimates to a present-dollar-valued
environmental impact.11
The results are reported in Table 9. C4C results in savings of $317 million.
Given the budget of $3 billion, our estimate implies that $1 spent on C4C resulted
in $0.11 in environmental benefits. In general, making additional vehicles available
for trade-in by raising the MPG requirement reduces the environmental impact
as fewer emissions are reduced. Increasing the subsidy for truck-to-car trade-ins
reduces the impact relative to C4C, even if the subsidy for car-to-car trade-ins
is set to $0, because the increase in the subsidy amount reduces the number of
households who are able to participate. Conversely, reducing the subsidy increases
the benefits as additional consumers are able to participate and a sufficient number
of willing consumers exist to exhaust the subsidy budget.
11See the 3% discount rate scenario of https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2016-12/documents/sc_co2_tsd_august_2016.pdf
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TABLE 9.
Environmental Benefits Under Cash For Clunkers and
Alternative Policies
Subsidy Amount Trade-in MPG Requirement
Truck → Car All Others 16 17 18 19 20
$2,500 $2,500 614 565 497 438 381
$4,500 $2,500 418 406 400 391 382
$4,500 $4,500 357 342 326 307 281
$6,500 $2,500 293 286 282 280 277
$6,500 $4,500 289 282 278 273 267
$6,500 $6,500 265 259 249 241 228
Notes: Environmental benefits are in millions of 2009 dollars
under a budget of $3 billion. The Cash for Clunkers policy is in
bold. The optimal policy by this metric is in italics.
Consumer Surplus and Purchasing Power Inequality
Finally, to calculate the effect of C4C on purchasing power inequality, we
must first calculate the consumer surplus generated by the vehicle market under the
steady-state equilibrium and under C4C. In our model, Vi represents the discounted
sum of utility from income and vehicle use for household i. We transform this to
a dollar value for each household by dividing by the marginal utility of net income
(yi − C + R(·))−1. We compute this value for each household in 2009 with and
without the C4C program to calculate the consumer surplus generated by the
policy.
The results are in Table 10. C4C generates a total of $849 million in
consumer surplus – the marginal pass-through of an addition dollar of government
spending to consumer surplus is $0.28. As in the other analyses, in general
increasing the subsidy reduces the consumer surplus as fewer households can
participate, though this effect is offset by the fact that the households that do
participate receive a larger transfer. The highest consumer surplus increases come
when the subsidy is reduced to $2,500.
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TABLE 10.
Consumer Surplus Under Cash For Clunkers and Alternative Policies
Subsidy Amount Trade-in MPG Requirement
Truck → Car All Others 16 17 18 19 20
$2,500 $2,500 1,019 991 1,447 1,315 1,264
$4,500 $2,500 665 634 721 759 802
$4,500 $4,500 765 764 849 931 1,040
$6,500 $2,500 753 739 750 750 751
$6,500 $4,500 764 753 768 778 798
$6,500 $6,500 791 786 806 820 853
Surplus values are in millions of 2009 dollars. The Cash for Clunkers
policy is in bold. The optimal policy in terms of consumer surplus
increases is in italics.
These increases are not distributed uniformly for three reasons. First,
households vary in the level of subsidy needed to incentivize a new vehicle purchase
in the year of the program (and therefore the extent to which the fixed-size credit
provides income above their purchase threshold). Second, households vary in their
preferences for vehicles, which implies that the surplus from a new vehicle purchase
will far as well. Finally, households vary in income and therefore in the marginal
utility of income. Figure 5 illustrates the distribution of consumer surplus over
participating households under C4C. Though the credit is $4,500, more than half of
the consumers receive surplus of less than $2,000.
This uneven distribution of consumer surplus implies that, at least within
the set of C4C participants, the program may increase inequality. We test this by
calculating the proportion of the subsidy budget which is spent on households in
the bottom half of the income distribution. The results are reported in Table 11.
Under C4C, almost 99% of the subsidy dollars go to the top half of the income
distribution. This is in large part due to the need for households to be able to
purchase a new vehicle when given the subsidy; very few households below the
median can afford to, even with a $4,500 subsidy. Increasing the maximum subsidy
32
FIGURE 5.
Distribution of Consumer Surplus Under Cash for Clunkers
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to $6,500 increases the share of subsidy dollars distributed to the bottom half of the
income distribution to between 13% - 20% depending on the other implementation
details. We thus conclude that these policies are not an effective mechanism for
reducing income inequality.
TABLE 11.
Percentage of Subsidy Budget Distributed to Households in the Bottom Half of the
Income Distribution
Subsidy Amount Trade-in MPG Requirement
Truck → Car All Others 16 17 18 19 20
$2,500 $2,500 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
$4,500 $2,500 2.0 1.6 2.3 3.1 2.5
$4,500 $4,500 0.9 0.7 1.1 1.4 1.1
$6,500 $2,500 19.2 19.3 18.5 18.8 18.6
$6,500 $4,500 15.9 16.2 15.6 15.8 15.5
$6,500 $6,500 13.4 13.7 13.9 14.2 14.9
Notes: The Cash for Clunkers policy is in bold. The optimal
policy by this metric is in italics.
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Conclusion
Different constituencies can have interests that are diametrically opposed.
Competition between politicians for votes and campaign contributions can
exacerbate these differences and result in socially sub-optimal policies (Grossman
and Helpman, 1996). As a consequence, policymakers generally seek policies that
allow them to form winning coalitions by appealing to the interests of different
groups (Persson, 1998).
Cash for Clunkers is an example of one such policy. Touted as a way to
stimulate flagging domestic industry and reduce carbon emissions and income
equality all at the same time, it quickly gained support from multiple groups
and easily passed the U.S. House and Senate by large margins (Bunkley, 2009).
However, since consumers and vehicles are heterogeneous, the success of any tied-
scrappage subsidy program is related to the distribution of consumers and vehicles
which are affected.
We analyze Cash for Clunkers and variations on the policy with a dynamic
model of vehicle portfolio choice in which consumers differ by income and
preferences for different vehicle mixes and vehicles differ by type and age. We find
that, per dollar of government spending, the program resulted in roughly $0.11
in environmental benefits, $0.28 in consumer surplus, and $0.31 in net additional
consumer spending on vehicles. As these benefits sum to less than $1, we conclude
that the policy did not achieve the trifecta and the government’s aims could have
been better served by simply allocating the budget of the program directly to
households, environmental programs, and vehicle manufacturers according to each
group’s welfare weights. Insofar that our results indicate that auto manufacturers
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received the largest gains from the policy, C4C may represent an consequence of
industry capture in the sense of Stigler (1971).
Our results are largely driven by the fact that much of the program’s
resources were spent on inframarginal consumers, and the marginal consumers
were largely above the median income. Indeed, we find the program exacerbated
income inequality in the sense that only one percent of the subsidy dollars went to
individuals in the lower half of the income distribution. Variations of the program
could improve each of the outcomes in turn. From the perspective of government
spending, a positive rate of return could have been achieved simply by reducing the
size of the subsidy from $4,500 to $2,500. Such a program would have generated
$0.17 in environmental benefits, $0.48 in consumer surplus, and $0.79 in net
additional spending, for a total of $1.44 per dollar of subsidy distributed. However,
as such a program would also have increased income inequality, we conclude that it
would not achieve the trifecta.
Our results speak to the need to consider both heterogeneity across vehicles
and the dynamic behavior of consumers in order to capture the full effect of
programs which seek to influence behavior in the primary or secondary vehicle
markets. To the extent that policymakers seek to manage vehicle fleets within their
jurisdictions, for example by implementing fuel economy standards (Portney et al.,
2003; West and Williams, 2005; Anderson et al., 2011) or subsidizing the purchase
of electric vehicles (Li et al., 2017; Seo and Shapiro, 2018), our approach may be
used to analyze the extent to which such policies will be effective.
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CHAPTER III
USING MACHINE LEARNING TO IDENTIFY HETEROGENEITY IN
VEHICLE EXCHANGE PROGRAMS
Introduction
The United States is one of the largest contributors to CO2 emission levels in
the world, ranking number two in total emmisions, and number eleven in per capita
terms per The World Bank.1 Personal automobiles are significant contributors
to these levels; in fact, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has begun
imposing stricter regulations on emission standards for automobiles. Many of the
cars and trucks on the road today, however, were not subject to these standards
when manufactured.
In 2009, the federal government introduced a temporary program, Cash for
Clunkers. The program offered participants a credit of up to $4,500 for scrapping
their old vehicle when buying a new vehicle. The goals of this program were
twofold. As this program was introduced during the Great Recession, the first
was to stimulate a hard-hit automobile industry in an ailing economy. The second
was to get older vehicles, particularly trucks, off the street and replace them with
newer, fuel-efficient ones. This goal was implemented by making it mandatory that
all trade-ins must get a combined MPG rating of less than 18 MPG and that the
purchase vehicle must increase fuel efficiency.
1China ranks higher the the U.S. in total emissions. In terms of per capita, Saudia Arabia is
the only country in the top ten with a population above 10 million. The World Bank data can be
found here: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/en.atm.co2e.pc?most_recent_value_
desc=true
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Prior research into this topic includes Quan and Singer (2015) and Miller
et al. (2018). Both developed a structural model to quantify the benefits of
the program. The results of both papers were that the costs of the program
greatly outweighed the benefits. However, none of the prior research into the
Cash for Clunkers policy incorporated household heterogeneity when performing
their analysis. Typically, structural estimation does not lend itself to this form
of analysis due to computational limitations. In this project, I develop a new
method to incorporate microdata from the Consumer Expenditure Survey to
estimate correlations in observables among households. Using the CEX data, I can
estimate the latent variables for household vehicle preference. This approach is an
improvement over the previous literature because the estimates are dependent on
household observation and their covariates, rather than a parameterization.
I achieve this by borrowing from the machine-learning literature. Machine
learning (ML) is poised to be the next big thing within the field of economics. As it
stands now, there are but a few papers that cross disciplines between the structural
methods used in industrial organization and the algorithms of machine learning.
The lack of research into that topic space leaves a relevant gap in the literature.
In this paper, I develop and apply an approach to integrate these two methods
to evaluate economic policy. I present the implementation of two methods that
fall under machine learning that improve upon the current iterations of structural
modeling.
These implementations aim to classify a better approach to calibrating
structural parameters. In my analyses, I demonstrate that both principle-
component analysis and the use of a neural network can be used to compact
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significantly more dimensions of the household into structural modeling—without
increasing computation burdens—than with current methods.
In addition to the providing insights into the effectiveness of the Cash for
Clunkers policy, the approach developed in this paper can be applied to a wide
variety of structural problems. In the most general sense, the methods developed
in this paper can be applied to structural models for which the researcher possess
individual level data and unobserved preference parameters.
The remainder of the paper is presented as follows. Section 3.2 discusses in
detail the previous economic research into both analysis of the Cash for Clunkers
program, as well as the literature of machine learning and economics. Next, I give
an overview of the Cash for Clunkers program, including its legislative history and
eligibility requirements. In Section 3.4, I present the foundations for the model that
I employ. To estimate the model, I incorporate multiple datasets from different
sources—which are discussed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 presents how I use the data
to estimate and solve the model. Results are reported in Section 3.7, and Section
3.8 summarizes my findings.
Literature
This project is an intersection of ML techniques and economic policy analysis.
In what follows, I discuss the relevant literature related to each of these two areas
in turn. The ML literature is a relatively new to economics with most of the work
being performed in the last decade. Athey (2018) states that “ML will have a
dramatic impact on the field of economics within a short time frame.” While there
is a vast literature on ML, its impact on economic research is tempered. Much of
the related research is yet to come; there are a few publications to reference.
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In recent years, ML has been incorporated into economic research with
greater frequency. Bjo¨rkegren and Grissen (2017) uses mobile phone usage data
to predict the likelihood of loan repayments. Their result outperforms models
that incorporate credit bureau information. Goel et al. (2016) analyze the hotly
debated stop-and-frisk policy in New York City and demonstrate that if the policy
is limited to the 6% of most likely offenders, the officers could “recover the majority
of weapons and mitigate racial disparities in who is stopped.” Glaeser et al. (2016)
run a tournament in conjunction with the city of Boston on restaurant hygiene
prediction. The tournament provided algorithms that prove capable of predicting
inspection outcomes on future inspections. These papers illustrate the wide range
of possibilities in which ML algorithms can influence economics.
Unlike the previously discussed papers, this project is based on a structural
model of consumer choice. Some papers in the literature that deal with this
interaction of ML and consumer choice are Ruiz et al. (2017) and Athey et al.
(2018). The first of these develops a probabilistic model of shopping data based
on consumer choice. The second uses cellphone location data to estimate restaurant
effectiveness. They do this by estimating latent variables about both the firm and
consumers using a utility maximization framework. This latter paper more closely
resembles the work outlined in this proposal.
The other aspect of this project is the Cash for Clunkers program itself.
This program has been studied quite extensively in the literature. Many of
these papers have investigated the environmental benefits of the program. These
include, most notably, Quan and Singer (2015), which adopts a model of vertical
product integration from Gavazza et al. (2014), henceforth GLR, to study the
U.S. automobile industry. Miller et al. (2018) further develops this model by
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incorporating the horizontal differentiation between cars and trucks, a vital aspect
of the government program. Both researchers find lackluster returns on investment
from the Cash for Clunkers program.
However, despite the current research determining that the program was an
apparent failure, similar programs have been introduced across the globe. The
Romanian government has offered an automobile scrappage program since 2005,
increasing the incentive to 6,500 Leu (about $1,600) in 2014, Auto (2015). Butcher
(2018) highlights multiple proposals for a London-based program.
The Cash for Clunkers Program
The Cash for Clunkers program, officially the “Car Allowance Rebate
System” (and henceforth referred to as C4C), was a nationwide vehicle exchange
program implemented by Congress. The program allowed any household to trade
in a vehicle and receive a credit toward the purchase of a new vehicle. The program
was slated to run from July 1, 2009, to November 1, 2009; however, the initial $1
billion budget ran out within the first month. In response, Congress allocated $2
billion in extra funds. The total $3 billion allocation was spent within two months
and the program ended on August 24, 2009.
The official goals of the program were two-fold. As durable goods,
automobiles typically experience larger drops in sales during economic downturns.
Therefore, the primary goal was to support the U.S. auto industry. The secondary
goal, supported by the MPG requirements discussed later in this section, was the
environmental benefit.
The size of the credit received by households was either $3,500 or $4,500.
Trade-ins were grouped into multiple types: Passenger cars, Category 1 trucks,
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Category 2 trucks, and Category 3 trucks. Passenger cars typically included sedans
(e.g. the Toyota Camry, Ford Focus). Category 1 trucks included minivans and
SUVs. The most popular Category 1 trucks traded in were the Ford Explorer and
Jeep Grand Cherokee. Category 2 trucks traded in were primarily standard trucks.
The most popular trade-ins were the Ford F150 and Chevrolet C1500. Category 3
trucks are larger models, but accounted for only 1% of vehicles traded in under the
program.
To be eligible for the credit, households not only needed to trade in a vehicle
while purchasing a new vehicle, the new vehicle had to exhibit an increase in fuel
efficiency. Traded-in vehicles were required to have a combined MPG of 18 or
less, be in working condition and less than 25 years old. To be eligible for the
$3,500 credit, households trading in a passenger car had to purchase a new vehicle
with at least a 4 MPG improvement. If the new vehicle had a 10 MPG or more
improvement, the household would be eligible for the $4,500 credit. If a household
was trading in a truck, it only needed to improve the fuel efficiency by 2 MPG to
receive the smaller $3,500 credit or only by 5 to receive the larger $4,500 credit.
Given that trucks typically have lower starting MPG and a lower
improvement requirement in the context of the program, it was much easier to
receive the credit if the household was trading in a truck. This is visible in the
summary statistics of the program, as 85% of the vehicles traded in fell into one of
the three truck categories, while only 41% of the new vehicles purchased as part of
this program were trucks.
Under the Cash for Clunkers program, a variety of vehicles were traded in.
Figure 6 provides two different histograms that demonstrate two dimensions for
which there was substantial variation in trade ins. These plots emphasis why,
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when attempting to model the effect of the program, it is so important to focus
intently on the heterogeneity in the households that led to such variation among
the participants.
FIGURE 6.
Distributions of Vehicle Trade-Ins by Age and Value
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(a): Data from Consumer Expenditure Survey, 1996-2017 Q1 sample. (b): Data from National
Highway and Saftey Administration. Age refers to years since model year.
While this study only considers the U.S. automobile market in the context of
C4C, many similar programs have been implemented across the globe, particularly
during the height of the financial crisis. The largest of these was the program in
Germany. The German program had a budget of e5 billion Euros and ran for the
entirety of 2009. Any car older than nine years was eligible as part of the German
program. Spain, France and the U.K. also implemented vehicle exchange programs.
Model
In this section, I develop a model of discrete consumer choice. The model is
developed similarly to GLR, Quan and Singer, and Miller et al., but allows for the
introduction of many additional forms of heterogeneity in households. Presentation
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of the model is made in two parts. The first can be thought of as the “inner”
or structural model. The second, or “outer” layer (grounded in ML techniques),
determines how heterogeneity is incorporated into the model.
Structural Foundation
Vehicles are differentiated by vintage a ∈ {x ∈ Z | 0 ≤ x < A?}, where A? is
the first vintage for which no vehicles exist. The number of vehicles on the road is
generally declining in vintage. Imposing A? allows the non-consideration of vehicles
that make up a disproportionately small fraction of the fleet. Imposing A? has
the effect of exogenously scrapping any vehicle that reaches this age. There is an
exogenously determined stock of vehicles xa. Vehicles have prices pa and qualities
qa.
Households, indexed by i, are infinitely lived and optimally choose to own
zero, one, or two vehicles. Households are heterogeneous in their preferences.
Households are endowed with real income, y. Households have heterogeneous
preference (γi) for vehicles, as well as a heterogeneous marginal utility (αi)
parameter for additional vehicles. The form that these parameters take is discussed
further on in this section.
Households decide how many vehicles (up to two) and of what vintage
to purchase those vehicles. Let a be the age of the first vehicle owned by the
household, and b be the age of the second. The time-invariant utility that
household i earns from their holding of vehicles is
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ui(a, b) =

0 if a = b = ∅
γiqa if b = ∅
γi(qa + αiqb) otherwise.
(3.1)
The first case is a household that does not own any vehicles, while the second
corresponds to the utility received by a household with one vehicle. The third is the
utility received from a household with three vehicles.
While gaining utility from their holdings of vehicles, households can enter
the market and either buy an additional vehicle, sell one of their fleet, or exchange
vehicles (both buying and selling). Households incur transaction costs when they
enter the market to sell a vehicle. There is a constant cost to all trade-ins (ψ0), as
well as a cost proportional to the price of the vehicle traded in (ψ1). I use Ψ(
•)
to denote the total transaction cost associated with trading in a given vehicle.
Households are limited to one vehicle transaction per period. Now I definite the
transition dynamics that govern how households move from their portfolio holdings
in one period to the next. Let a be the age of the household’s newest vehicle, and
b the age of their second vehicle, if owned. Let R(a′, b′; a, b) be the cost associated
with beginning a period with (a, b) and moving into the next period with (a′, b′).
There are three states for which a household can begin a period (zero, one, or two
vehicles.) Households can either stay in their state with no action, transition up
or down a state (either if they own one vehicle), or stay in their state by entering
the market exchanging vehicles (not an option for zero vehicle households). This
results in nine distinct values for for R(•). However, there are 14 different relations
between a, b, a′, b′ that determine which of the nine values that the households
incur. I define R(•) piecewise
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R(a′, b′; a, b) =

0 if a = b = a′ = b′ = ∅
0 if a′ = a+ 1, b′ = b = ∅
0 if a′ = a+ 1, b′ = b+ 1
Ψ(pa + 1) if a ≥ 0, a′ = b′ = b = ∅
Ψ(pa + 1) if a > b ≥ 0, a′ = b+ 1, b′ = ∅
Ψ(pb + 1) if a > b ≥ 0, a′ = a+ 1, b′ = ∅
−pa′ if a′ ≥ 0, a = b = b′ = ∅
−pb′ if a′ = a+ 1, b′ > a′, b = ∅
−pa′ if a′ < b′, b′ = a+ 1, b = ∅
Ψ(pa + 1)− pa′ if a′ 6= a+ 1, b = b′ = ∅
Ψ(pa + 1)− pa′ if a′ < b′, b′ = b+ 1
Ψ(pb + 1)− pb′ if a′ = a+ 1, b′ > a′
Ψ(pa + 1)− pb′ if a′ = b+ 1, b′ < a′
Ψ(pb + 1)− pa′ if a′ < b′, b′ = a+ 1.
(3.2)
The first three cases represent a household with zero, one, two vehicles
electing not to enter the market and instead let their vehicles age. The fourth,
fifth, and sixth case correspond to when a one-vehicle household sells their vehicle,
a two-vehicle household sells their newer vehicle, or a two-vehicle household sells
their older vehicle, respectively. The next three cases, the seventh through ninth,
correspond to a household without any vehicles purchasing, or a one-vehicle
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household purchasing a vehicle older than their current vehicle, and in the ninth
case, a vehicle newer than their current vehicle. The tenth is when a one-vehicle
household enters the market and exchanges their vehicles. The final four cases
involve a two-vehicle household entering the market and exchanging one of their
vehicles. The eleventh is if they exchange their newest vehicle for a different model
which is still their newest. The twelfth is if they enter the market with their older
vehicle, while maintaining the ordering. The thirteenth is when they sell their
newer vehicle and the vehicle that they purchase is old enough that their previously
older vehicle is now their newest. The fourteenth and final case is the opposite of
case thirteen. The household exchanged their older vehicle for one that becomes
their newest, thereby transitioning the original youngest vehicle to the oldest.
In addition to earning utility from vehicles, and paying to enter the market,
households pay a cost of ownership. Operating costs (C1, C2) depend on the
amount of vehicles owned, but not the vintage. With all these components, I have
the tools to write down the households’ value function
Vi(a, b) = ui(a, b) + max
a′,b′
[ln (yi − C +R(a′, b′; a, b)) + βVi(a′, b′)] . (3.3)
When considering equilibrium in this model, I analyze it in the context of
steady state and opt to evaluate the effect of a shock (C4C) at a later time. By
considering steady-state behavior, it allows household behavior to be separately
characterized by the decision of how many vehicles to purchase. This is because,
in the absence of external shocks, no household that has previously decided to own
a certain number of vehicles (resulting from optimal behavior), would suddenly
elect to change their behavior. Note that this result does not apply to the vintage
of those vehicles because, despite the removal of disrupting shocks, the vehicle
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portfolios of households still age along the steady-state equilibrium path. The value
function for a one-vehicle household, suppressing the household notation, becomes
V˜ (y, γ, a) = γqa + ln(y − C1) (3.4)
+ β max
{
V˜ (y, a+ 1), max
a′
V˜ (y, a′) + ln
(
y − pa′ + Ψ(pa+1)− C1
y − C1
)}
.
Here the household receives their utility from their vehicle and from their
income endowment net operating costs. In the second line, they make the optimal
decision between allowing their vehicle to age and entering the market to replace it.
Next, I consider the two-vehicle households. Quan and Singer argues that
when transaction costs are sufficiently high, two-vehicle households will default
into making within-household exchanges. This allows them to avoid a substantial
amount of transaction costs by naturally allowing their newer vehicle to age
into their older vehicle when they enter the market to replace an aging vehicle.
This corresponds to the final case from the transaction cost dynamics. The value
function of a two-vehicle household is represented by
V˜ (y, γ, α, a, b) = γ(qa + αqb) + ln(y − C2) + β max
{
V˜ (y, γ, α, a+ 1, b+ 1), (3.5)
max
a′
V˜ (y, γ, α, a′, a+ 1) + ln
(
y − pa′ + Ψ(pb+1)− C2
y − C2
)}
.
Here, if the household opts to enter the market, they do so by selling their
oldest vehicle and purchasing a vehicle which then becomes their newest, while
allowing the vehicle that they keep to age. When the value functions are written
in this form, they exhibit a recursive behavior which allows for an analytical
solution in the household’s decisions of the age of vehicles to purchase. Consider
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the household that owns a new vehicle. That household will let that vehicle age
until they determine that the quality has dropped far enough to a point where they
would like to replace it. When they enter the market, what age of vehicle would
they replace it with? In the steady-state equilibrium path, they will replace it with
a vehicle of the age that is equal to the purchase age of their original vehicle. So if
I can determine the age of the vehicle the household will buy, which I represent
by a, the only remaining unknown is how long households choose to keep their
vehicles, represented by n. If both quantities are known, it is enough to completely
characterize the steady-state behavior of the household. In practice, it is required
to calculate every combination of a, n and identify the one with the highest value.
Below is the closed form steady-state value of a one-vehicle household for a given
combination of a, n2
V (y, γ, a, n) =
γqa + ln(y − pa + Ψ(pn)− C1) +
n−a∑
j=1
βj[γqa+j + ln(y − C1)]
1− βn−a+1 . (3.6)
From the closed form solutions of the value function, it is possible to compute
decision rules, {a?(yi, γi, αi), n?(yi, γi, αi), and m?(yi, γi, αi) that determine given
household characteristics the optimally chosen a, n, and m, where, m is the spread
in ownership of the two vehicles in a multi-vehicles household’s fleet.
An equilibrium in this model is a collection of decision rules {a?(yi, γi, αi),
n?(yi, γi, αi), m
?(yi, γi, αi)} and prices pa ∀ a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T ?} such that households
are maximizing and markets clear
2Only the one vehicle case is presented here. Information on two-vehicle households can be
found in Appendix A.
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∫
hia(y, γ, α)d(y, γ, α) = x
i
a ∀a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , A? − 1}, (3.7)
where hia(y, γ, α) is the steady-state distribution of owners of vehicle type i with
vintage a. Simply put, the vehicle-ownership decisions for each vintage—of all
households—aggregates to the observed exogenous stock of that vintage.
In the remainder of this section, I describe three different methods for
implementing household heterogeneity.
Methods of Moments
Previous studies of this market have used method of moments to encapsulate
consumer heterogeneity. See GLR, Quan and Singer (2015) and Miller et al. (2018).
This requires assuming a parameter distribution for the heterogeneous parameters
and then using optimization techniques to solve for the distributions of those
parameters. In this section, that is the procedure that I implement. There are three
forms of heterogeneity: income, y; the preference for vehicles, γ; and the marginal
utility of an addition vehicle, α. I take y to be income drawn from my dataset on
consumers.
The preference parameters γ is distributed Log-Normal with mean 1. This
restriction is a normalization; as if it was not the case, it would be impossible to
distinguish the mean of the γ distribution from the mean of the quality parameters
q. The Log-Normal distribution is defined on the interval [0, ∞]. This property can
be interpreted that the preference for vehicle ownership for any household cannot
be negative.
The marginal utility parameter α, is assumed to be distributed according to
a Beta distribution. Notably, the Beta distribution is defined on the interval [0, 1],
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meaning that the marginal utilities are within this interval. This decision is made
based on economic theory because we expect that the utility gained from additional
units of the same good should be positive, but less than the first. Both parameters
of the Beta distribution are free to be set by the optimization algorithm.
The distribution of the moments method for implementing heterogeneity can
be summarized by
γ ∼ Lognormal(1/2− σ2γ/2, σγ), α ∼ Beta(β1, β2) (3.8)
The shortcoming of the above method is that the draws from income,
preference, and marginal utility are completely independent from each another.
This is not a how we expect the world to operate, nor is it a restriction made
from lack of data. The reason that household heterogeneity has a limited scope
is due to computational limitations. In practice, optimizing over as few as the three
parameters described above can take hours or days. In what follows, I implement
two distinct ML techniques to reduce the computation burden from including
additional dimensions of heterogeneity.
Principle Components Analysis
If computational power was not a restriction, one might hope to run a
regression of the form
γ = X ′βγ +  (3.9)
to determine the γ values. I focus on γ rather than α but they are analogous.
Where the X matrix was a collection of data that the econometrician believed to
depend on γ; however, there are issues with this proposed approach. The first is
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that the γ values are not observed. This means that solving for the values of β
would require optimizing over a βγ+βα size state-space, where the second set comes
from the analogous α regression. This is not computationally feasible if you were to
consider all possible observables that influence γ. Even if it were, it would require
the existence of at least βγ + βα moments with which to optimize.
I use principle components analysis (PCA) to alleviate this issue. Principle
component analysis reduces the data into ordered orthogonal components.
Components are ordered such that the first component is that which encapsulates
the largest amount of variance in the dataset. The second principle component
would contain the second largest variance; the intuition being, that using only the
first few principle components would capture a substantial majority of the variation
in X.
To compute the principle components, one must start with a data matrix X,
in which each row is an observation and each column is mean zero. Next, compute
the covariance matrix C = X
′X
n−1 , where n is the number of observations. With the
covariance matrix, find the eigenvalues of C, Λ = V −1CV . Λ should be a diagonal
matrix where the non-zero elements are the eigenvalues of C.
If the original dataset had K columns, let gK =
∑K
k=1 Λk,k. Sort Λ such that
Λ1,1 is the largest eigenvalue, and the eigenvalues descend further down the matrix.
Finally, for a given threshold level T find the smallest L such that gl
gK
=
∑L
k=1 Λk,k∑K
k=1 Λk,k
>
T . The first L eigenvectors of V are the principle components of X.
With the principle components in hand, we can define how they relate to γ,
α. Let σ be a 3 × 1 matrix. Consider the first two principle components of X. I
define
γ = σ1
X ′PCA1
X ′PCA1
+ (1− σ1)X
′PCA2
X ′PCA2
(3.10)
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α = σ3
[
σ2
X ′PCA1
X ′PCA1
+ (1− σ2)X
′PCA2
X ′PCA2
]
(3.11)
Here, γ is once again set to be mean 1. σ1 dictates how much of the first
principle component goes into γ while the rest come from the second principle
component. For α, the term inside the brackets is mean 1 and σ2 determine how
much of the first principle component goes into α. σ3 determine the mean of α,
which is confined to be between 0 and 1.
Notice that this has a similar form to the distributions of γ and α from the
methods of moments. In fact, to solve for σ requires using methods of moments.
However, unlike the regression presented at the start of this subsection, this
is characterized in full by just three unknown parameters. In contrast to the
original method of moment proposal, this definition incorporates any number of
demographic variables to which the researcher has access. The restriction of this
instance is that the ratio
∑2
k=1 Λk,k∑K
k=1 Λk,k
might not be as large as desired to incapsulate
enough of the variation in the data. In what follows, I provide one final alternative
that removes this concern.
Neural Network
Previously, I discussed the possibility of running the following regression
γ = X ′βγ +  (3.12)
while noting that to do so would require having already obtained γ or require
running the structural model within the regression. Here I explore an alternative to
obtain values of γ. While γ is unobserved, what if there were some observed data
that could act as a proxy for γ? Call this data Y . Mathematically, if the researcher
52
had access to Y = f(X) and a g(•) such that g(Y ) = γ, then they could obtain
the values of γ. Note that it is necessary to find a similar set of proxy data and
transformation function for α.
It turns out that such as dataset Y does exist. While γ and α are not directly
observed, the vehicle ownership decisions are. Specifically, it can be observed if a
household purchases zero, one, or two vehicles. It can reasonably be interpreted
that a household that owns more vehicles has a higher preference for vehicles.
Similarly, a household that falls into the two-vehicle category likely has a higher
preference for their second vehicle than those that only own one vehicle.
If vehicle ownership decisions are acting as Y , then what plays the role of
f(•)? I use a neural network to predict which household characteristics X are more
likely to result in different vehicle ownership decisions Y . A neural net is typically
used to predict a finite set of outcome variables from a finite set of input variables
subject to some loss function. Many different options exist for the complexity of the
network, learning rate, and the loss function selected. Without providing a whole
textbook worth of information, I present the specifics of the basic neural net that I
employ.
The input variables are made up of any amount of household characteristics,
while the output is the decision of how many vehicles to own. A standard feature
of a neural net is the inclusion of “hidden” layers that are placed between the
input and output layers. These allow the model to identify patterns in the data
that a one-stage setup might otherwise overlook. I use one of these layers with a
classic sigmoid activation function. Because households can only opt into one (and
must opt into one) of the three choices of vehicle ownership, I transform the final
activations values into probabilities.
53
I use a cross-entropy loss function, which is used for estimating the efficiency
of an estimated probability distribution from its true distribution. The loss function
is
∑
h∈“0”,“1”,“2”
− P (h)log(P̂ (h)) (3.13)
= −P (“0”)log(P̂ (“0”))− P (“1”)log(P̂ (“1”))− P (“2”)log(P̂ (“2”))
Since the household will have chosen one of the three outcomes, one of P (h) will be
equal to 1, while the other two will be equal to 0. The loss for a given observation
is just log(P̂ (h)) for whichever group (h) to which the household belongs.
After training the model on a hold-out sample, I calculate the estimated
probabilities to which group the household belongs. Let p0 be the probability that
the neural net assigns to the household owning zero vehicle, p1 the probability
it assigned to owning one vehicle, and p2 to two. I then calculate the expected
number of vehicles owned
E(V ) = p1 + 2 ∗ p2 (3.14)
and the ratio of the probabilities of owning two vehicles to owning one vehicle
Ratio =
p2
p1
. (3.15)
A higher number of expected vehicles owned implies a higher preference for
vehicles, so this expectation relates to γ. A higher value of the ratio implies a
higher marginal utility from the second vehicle, relating to α. Keep in mind that
the expected number of vehicles owned, while similar, is not the same thing as
the preference for vehicles. Instead, the only conclusion is that households with
54
a higher expected number of vehicles should have higher γ. To get the values of
γ requires the g(•) that transforms the value of the expectation to a preference
parameter.
The values of γ should come from a distribution confined to the positive
values, with mean 1 (so that the qualities can be identified). One such distribution
is the Log-Normal distribution. What remains is to map from the expectation
on number of vehicles to own, into the Log-Normal distribution. To do this for
the whole range of possible households would require an analytical form for
the distribution of expectations; however, it is not necessary to map the whole
distribution, just the household in the model. To do this, assume there at N
households, each with a calculated expected value of vehicle ownership, sort so that
the highest expectation is first. To proceed, I take N draws from a Log-Normal
distribution, sorted in descending order; then map, one-to-one, the household to the
draws.
A similar procedure takes place to obtain the values for α. In this case, draw
from a Beta distribution and assign the highest draws to the households with the
highest value for the ration calculated prior. To determine the best parameters
from distributions from which to draw α and γ, the familiar method of moments
is implemented. Alternatively, computational requirements can be substantially
reduced if the user is comfortable specifying reasonable parameters for the Log-
Normal and Beta distributions.
Data
The datasets used to evaluate the model presented in this paper are from
a variety of sources. As previously discussed in Section 3.3, data from the
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Cash for Clunkers program is provided from the National Highway and Safety
Administration. The primary data source used in this chapter is the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX). Additionally, I use data from the Kelley Blue Book for
analysis of transaction costs.
Consumer Expenditure Survey
The CEX provides data on American’s spending habits, containing published
data from 1996. The data used in this study is from 1996-2017. The data is
gathered by interviewing selected participants in four consecutive quarters. This
study uses the first quarter subsample from each report. This procedure ensures the
capture of each interviewee once, but not more.
The dataset reports the purchase decision of all item made by participating
households. In addition, it creates a record of all vehicle holdings of the households.
The vehicle holdings are used in the calibration of the model. This is elaborated
upon in Section 3.7. The CEX dataset also includes a wide range of demographic
variables for participating households. The demographic observations are used
to discern unobserved household preferences for the structural parameters in the
second-stage analysis. These primarily consist of dummy variables. The summary
statistics for the demographic variables are displayed in Table 12.
National Highway and Traffic Saftey Administration
The National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) data covers
all trade ins and new-vehicle purchases related to the Cash for Clunkers program.
A component of this data is vehicle model and type, with data provided on the
number of times the vehicle was traded in and purchased (if it was new in 2009) as
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TABLE 12.
CEX Demographic Information
Mean Std
Income 60046 58690
Adults 1.94 0.91
Children 0.58 1.02
Agea 49.6 17.4
Urban 0.94 -
Malea 0.47 -
Vehicle Holdingsb
No Vehicles 0.14 -
One Vehicle 0.34 -
Two Vehicles or more 0.53 -
Size of Locality
125K or less 0.13 -
125-330K 0.23 -
.33-1.2M 0.06 -
1.2-4M 0.24 -
4M or more 0.34 -
Region
Northeast 0.19 -
Midwest 0.23 -
South 0.35 -
West 0.22 -
Eductationa
High-school or less 0.39 -
Bachelor Degree 0.50 -
Graduate Degree 0.11 -
Racea
White 0.83 -
Black 0.11 -
Asian 0.04 -
Hispanica 0.13 -
Data from 2009Q1 CEX. N = 5, 727.
aRefers to the interviewee, rather than the
household.
bHistorical average from 1996-2017.
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part of the program, as well as other descriptors of the vehicle. Summary statistics
for the program are in Table 1 in Chapter II. This data was used to plot the age of
vehicles that were traded in as part of the program in Figure 6.
Kelley Blue Book
The July-September 2009 edition of the Kelley Blue Book (KBB) provides data
on the 2009 value of the most popular used vehicles produced from 1994-2008. I
use the KBB to compute transaction costs for the model. The KBB reports four
different values for each vehicle: the trade-in value for vehicles in fair condition;
the trade-in value for vehicles in good condition; the private-property value of
vehicles in good condition; and the retail value of vehicles in excellent condition.
Summary statistics for the trade-in value for vehicles in good condition and the
private property of value of vehicles in good condition are presented in Table 13.
TABLE 13.
Kelley Blue Book Summary Statistics
Mean Std
Trade-in Value 2957 2122
Private Property Value 4276 2406
Notes: Data from Kelley Blue Book. N =
1301.
Estimation
In this section, I discuss solving the model. This includes how I calibrate
the necessary parameters and what methods I use to solve for the variables that
remain. Unless stated otherwise, information pertains to all versions of the model.
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Calibration
The main dataset used for calibration is the CEX data, which is used to
calibrate the steady-state level of vehicle supply and price in the model. This is
done for the stock of vehicles. To do this, first obtain a record of all vintages owned
as a percentage of total vehicles on the road for each year in the data set. Then,
take the year-over-year percentage change in the occurrence of a given vintage.
After this, average the percentage changes with respect to age. Noting that in the
steady state, age is the same as vintage, apply this average change of age to the
relative stock of each vintage. For use in the simulation, a 5th-order polynomial is
fit to the data, this order is used due to nature of the curvature. Figure 7 illustrates
the relative stock obtained by applying this process to both cars and trucks.
FIGURE 7.
Distributions of Vehicle Stocks and Prices by Age
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Notes: Data from Consumer Expenditure Survey, 1996-2017 Q1 sample. Points denote sample
averages, lines are best-fit 5th-order polynomials. Age refers to years since model year.
With prices, take a similar approach. Parsing the records of vehicles
purchased in the previous 12 months reported in the Q1 sample from 1996-2017
of the CEX, obtain the median-price level of used vehicles of every vintage available
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on the market in each year. New prices for each year are obtained by looking at the
median purchase price of new vehicles in that year of that vintage. Next, obtain
the relative price of used-vehicles to the new-vehicle price for each year. Using the
median of these estimates by age, obtain the average price of a used vehicle of any
age relative to a new vehicle. Once again, the steady state allows us to interpret
ages as vintages; the price of each vintage is relative to the new-vehicle price. New-
vehicle price is matched to the median new-vehicle price in the Q1 sample of the
2009 CEX. As evidenced in Figure 7, there are rarely transactions of 15+ year-
old trucks observed; as such, the estimates are non-monotonic. I fit a 5th-order
polynomial to used vehicles with the restriction of a negative derivative to the data.
The price of new vehicles are set to the point estimate from the CEX data.
Transaction costs in the model are calibrated using data from the KBB. As
in Miller et al., I used the difference between the private-property value and the
value of vehicles in good condition to model transaction costs. To get a smooth
relation, OLS estimates are fit to these data. The results are displayed in Figure
2 in Chapter II. The results show that a linear fit is a good approximation to the
difference between the value of a vehicle and what a consumer can expect to receive
when trading that vehicle in. This relationship extends to the upper end of the
distribution without breaking down.3
I set the yearly household discount rate β equal to .95 and the maximum
age (A?) of vehicles to 20 years. Operating costs differ by the number of vehicles
owned. Operating costs are the sum of maintenance, registration, and fuel costs,
and are set at four times the median operating cost from the CEX Q1 2009. The
3I experimented with varying transaction costs by vehicle type, but the estimates are
essentially identical.
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frequencies of all vehicle combinations in the data and associated operating costs
are shown in Table 14.4
TABLE 14.
Distribution of Households and Ownership Costs Across Vehicle Portfolio Types
Vehicles Household Frequency Operating Cost
No Vehicles 13.9% $0
One Vehicle 33.6% $1360
Two Vehicles 52.5% $2800
Notes: Data from Q1 CEX 2009. Operating costs are in 2009 dollars and are annualized from
median quarterly measure.
The distribution for the income parameter, y, is drawn from reported income
from the 2009 CEX. The stock of cars and trucks, xa, are from figure 7. The values
are scaled so that the total stock is equivalent to the observed stock per household.
A?∑
a=0
xa = 1.386 = .336 + 2 ∗ .525
The frequency of households into certain types provides the primary moment
that the data aims to match. However, in all the implementations I described, there
were three free parameters to be estimated. This requires at least three moments
for them to match. Currently, there is only one because, while there are three
household types, by nature they must sum to one, removing one moment. Likewise,
the frequency of one vehicle household plus two times the frequency of two vehicle
households must sum to the stock of available vehicles. This leave only one moment
to match with the free parameters to be estimated.
There are other moments in that data that could be matched. GLR propose
the use of three addition moments. These three are described below and the value
4I experimented with allowing costs to vary by vintage, but it did not have a significant effect.
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from the data is provided for context.
Households with at least one vehicle
Households that acquired a vehicle in the last 12 months
= 2.89
Total stock of vehicles
Vehicles acquired in the last 12 months
= 5.30
Vehicles acquired in the last 12 months
New vehicles acquired in the last 12 months
= 3.26
These three provide the necessary additional information to complete the
calibration of the model.
Simulation
The remainder of the variables require solving the model rather than
calibration. Estimation of the model requires simulation. The final goal is to match
the data on:
1. the optimal decisions of the households result in the correct stock of vehicles
on the road, as determined by the calibration of xa; and
2. the frequency of household profiles are distributed according to Table 14.
I match the data with two optimization loops, referred to as an inner and an outer
loop. The inner loop solves for the qualities for a given set of consumers, while the
outer loop determines the process that generates the distribution of consumers.
Upon completion, the routine solves for qualities, qa, ∀ a, and for the parameters
that govern the distributions of γ and α. Below the procedure is outlined.
1. Guess values for the parameters that govern the distributions of γ and α.
2. Generate consumers according to the distributions of γ and α.
3. Guess qualities qa ∀ a ∈ {0, A? − 1}.
4. Update qualities as follows.
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a. Calculate optimal a, n, and m for each consumer given qualities.
b. Aggregate consumer vehicle decisions by vintage and type.
c. Increase qualities that do not have adequate representation and decrease
others.
5. Repeat step 3 until convergence.
6. Aggregate consumer decisions by household type.
7. Compare the frequency of each type of household to the values in Table 14.
8. Update guess of the parameters that govern the distributions of γ and α.
9. Repeat steps 2-8 until convergence.
In Section 3.4, I presented three different means of evaluating heterogeneity
in this model. Referring to the procedure above, the aspect that changes between
these different approaches is steps 1 and 2. In the next section I present my results
from evaluation of the model.
Results
There are three implementations of the model to consider: The method that
uses purely moment analysis; the method that incorporates principle component
analysis; and the method that uses a neural net. I begin with a comparison of the
results from the methods.
Comparison of Models
Table 15 provides context for how the distributions of γ and α behave in the
context of the three models. Notice that the correlation between income and the
two distributions is equal to zero in the baseline case. This is a result of the fact
that that specification draws γ and α independently.
Each model has its own set of quality estimates. These qualities are not
necessarily on an equal scale, due to any number of inputs that might change the
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TABLE 15.
Comparison of Machine Learning Models
Baseline PCA Neural Net Data
Vehicle Preference (γ)
σγ 0.990 - 1.007
σ1 - -0.296 -
Std(γ) 1.830 0.529 1.870
Cor(γ, Y ) 0 -0.562 0.197
Marginal Utility (α)
β1 0.654 - 0.448
β2 1.024 - 1.025
σ2 - 0.210 -
Mean(α) 0.387 0.692 0.300
Std(α) 0.294 0.241 0.292
Cor(α, Y ) 0 0.676 0.237
Moments
Moment 1 3.42 3.56 3.40 2.89
Moment 2 5.54 6.21 5.48 5.30
Moment 3 2.90 2.57 2.89 3.26
Moment 1 = Households with at least one vehicleHouseholds that acquired a vehicle in the last 12 months
Moment 2 = Total stock of vehiclesVehicles acquired in the last 12 months
Moment 3 = Vehicles acquired in the last 12 monthsNew vehicles acquired in the last 12 months
The fraction of variance captured in the PCA model by the first two
principle components is 99.9%.
N = 10, 000
level of the unobserved quality. Instead of presenting the raw numbers, deviations
from the mean are presented. The standardized qualities are presented in Figure 8.
All three models exhibit similar behavior in how the qualities of each
vehicle differ from the mean. Since the model has been designed to closely fit the
distribution of vehicle types by households, I cannot evaluate the effectiveness
of the model in that regard; however, there are other ways to determine if the
model is capturing the relevant aspects of the data. One way is to examine the
rate at which households with different income levels select different types of vehicle
ownership. The results from this exercise can be found in Table 16. The model
is solved to closely fit the distribution of vehicle types by households, but it also
performs quite well in representing the households’ decision by income brackets.
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TABLE 16.
Household Vehicle Type Portfolios by Income Quartile, CEX
Averages and Predicted Model Values
Income Quartile Zero Vehicles One Vehicle Two Vehicles
Lowest
30.5% 46.7% 22.8%
45.5% 34.8% 19.8%
56.0% 35.4% 8.5%
51.8% 34.2% 14.0%
Mid-Low
10.3% 47.0% 41.7%
9.7% 41.1% 49.2%
4.3% 54.2% 41.5%
5.5% 50.1% 44.4%
Mid-High
3.7% 27.8% 68.3%
2.6% 31.4% 66.0%
0.0% 34.6% 65.4%
1.4% 31.3% 67.3%
Highest
2.8% 14.4% 88.2%
0.4% 22.7% 76.9%
0.0% 5.4% 94.6%
0.2% 16.8% 83.0%
Values from the data are reported first. The second row are from the
baseline model. The third row is from the PCA model, and the final
row if from the neural net.
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FIGURE 8.
Standardized Qualities Estimates
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Counterfactuals
While the expanded models do not perform measureably better in the
analysis of income brackets, the counterfactuals are the primary reason that they
are included. In this subsection, I put the models through a series of counterfactual
exercises like that of C4C. First, I provide an oversight of how effective these
counterfactual programs can be on aggregate indicators. Due to the improvements
incorporating heterogeneity, it is possible to backtrack the distributional effects
that these counterfactuals have on different groups of households.
For all policies presented, four different credit levels $3,500, $4,500, $6,000,
and $9,000, are considered. The first two are the two credits offered under the
C4C program, and in addition, there are two larger credit amounts. For each
credit level, I also impose an MPG restriction on trade-in vehicles. Under C4C,
this was 18MPG for most vehicles. The effects if this requirement was removed are
presented for comparison. All policies assume the same $3 billion budget, and that
that there is sufficient demand to exhaust it. This is not a baseless assumption,
as the actual C4C program had significantly excess demand and the policies that
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considered consist of either larger credits or less stringent eligibility requirements.
Either of these changes should only result in increased demand.
To calculate which households participate in the counterfactual programs,
I model the program as a one-time shock to the model. Note that C4C, and all
policies considered, are tied subsidies, meaning that it required both the purchase
of a new vehicle and the trade in of an old vehicle. This means that any household
participating in the program would leave with the same number of vehicles as
with which they began. As such, I only need to consider how the policies effect
households within a set amount of vehicle ownership.
Households without any vehicles are not eligible because they do not have
access to a vehicle to trade-in. The policy shock for single household vehicles is
modeled as follows. First, calculate the value to the household of maintaining
its current path through the steady-state equilibrium. As an alternative to
this, present each eligible household (with a single vehicle meeting the MPG
requirement) the option to exchange that vehicle, with a new vehicle discounted
by the credit amount. If they opt to do this, calculate the value function associated
with keeping their new vehicle until the time their decision rule states that they
would sell it in equilibrium. All future vehicles they purchase would be consistent
with their steady-state equilibrium path. To determine if they opt-in to the
program, compare these two value function calculations.
For multiple vehicle households, first check for eligibility contingent on
whether their oldest vehicle meets the MPG restriction. Then, like single-vehicle
households, calculate the value function associated with remaining on their
equilibrium path. To determine the value of participation, calculate the value
function contingent on them trading in their oldest vehicle for a new vehicle, with
cost discounted by the size of the credit. While I do assume that households keep
their new vehicle purchased under the program until their equilibrium decision rule
dictates, I allow households to keep what becomes their older vehicle for a different
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number of periods than they would have without the program. By allowing them
to retain their vehicle for a longer (or shorter) period of time, it allows households
to maintain the gap between the ages of the two vehicles in their fleet, while still
returning to their equilibrium path in the long run. In order to determine how long
households keep this vehicle, the households are allow them to optimally choose the
best option given their characteristics. Finally, compare the value of participating
with optimal behavior, with that of maintaining their equilibrium path.
This first statistics illustrated below in Table 17 show what portion of eligible
households choose to participate under the different schemes. Unsurprisingly, as the
size of the credit increases, the number of willing participants increases. It appears
that as MPG requirement is waived, a lower percentage of eligible households elect
to participate. The reason for this is that the program only appeals to households
with older vehicles which typically have a lower MPG. Recall that the traded-in
vehicles are scrapped, meaning any household that would be trading in a vehicle
worth more than the size of the credit would never be rational. Thus, opening
the policy to households with all ranges of MPG requirements would reduce the
fraction of willing participants.
TABLE 17.
Household Participation Rates from Alternative Policies
Credit Restiction Baseline PCA Neural Net
$3,500 18 MPG 2.50 1.39 2.69
$3,500 No Limit 2.22 2.07 2.37
$4,500 18 MPG 4.63 8.10 4.66
$4,500 No Limit 4.21 7.45 4.34
$6,000 18 MPG 9.74 20.91 10.33
$6,000 No Limit 9.52 19.60 9.58
$9,000 18 MPG 37.37 55.58 36.06
$9,000 No Limit 35.37 53.92 33.29
Notes: The table above depicts the fraction of eligible
households that participate in the proposed programs.
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The primary goal of C4C was economic stimulus, so the next three tables
presented are indended to summarize how effective the counterfactuals would
have been at promoting it. The first metric is what fraction of the participants
would not have purchased a vehicle in 2009. This can be interpreted as how many
purchases would not have occurred in the absence of the C4C program. These
values can be seen in Table 18. As the size of the credit increases, a larger faction
of participants would not have purchased a vehicle in 2009 in the absence of the
program. This meaning that the program would have been more successful in
inducing new purchases with a larger credit.
TABLE 18.
Fraction of Purchases New to 2009 from Alternative
Policies
Credit Restriction Baseline PCA Neural Net
$3,500 18 MPG 48.3 33.3 41.5
$3,500 No Limit 45.8 26.7 41.2
$4,500 18 MPG 44.4 48.6 46.9
$4,500 No Limit 51.9 44.4 48.8
$6,000 18 MPG 48.9 58.7 48.2
$6,000 No Limit 52.7 58.2 55.4
$9,000 18 MPG 62.2 66.3 60.3
$9,000 No Limit 61.8 66.5 62.3
Notes: The table above depicts the fraction participating
households that would not have purchase a vehicle in
2009 in the absence of the proposed programs.
The number of incremental purchases does not tell the whole story concerning
the effectiveness of these proposals toward economic stimulus. As the credit size
increases, there are fewer households that can participate for the fixed $3 billion
budget. Table 19 illustrates how spending increased in 2009 as a result of the
counterfactuals. The total effect is diminished as the size of the credit increases,
due to reduced participation. The removal of the MPG requirement seems to have
no significant effect on the 2009 stimulus.
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TABLE 19.
Increase in 2009 Output from Alternative Policies
Credit Restriction Baseline PCA Neural Net
$3,500 18 MPG 13,697 14,840 12,460
$3,500 No Limit 13,225 13,159 12,536
$4,500 18 MPG 10,908 12,850 10,863
$4,500 No Limit 11,727 12,292 11,190
$6,000 18 MPG 8,896 10,713 8,681
$6,000 No Limit 9,408 10,426 9,434
$9,000 18 MPG 7,617 7,348 7,092
$9,000 No Limit 7,588 7,451 7,394
Notes: The table above depicts the change in 2009 output
as a result of the proposed programs. Values are in millions
of 2009 dollars.
While the previous two tables aimed to summarize the stimulus effects in
2009, the model developed in this paper can evaluate market effects beyond only
the year in which the policy is implemented. This is done by looking at the residual
effect of the decisions by the households that opted to participate. The overall
finding in Table 20 is that the long-run benefit of the program is significantly
diminished from the initial effect exhibited in 2009. This is because, while not all
participating households would have otherwise purchased in 2009, they likely would
have purchased within the next few years. In long run the only effect this program
has is to accelerate purchases by a few years.
The other stated goal of the program was to increase environmental quality.
In order to calculate the environmental benefits of the program, I considered CO2
offsets. To calculate the amount of CO2 removed from the atmosphere, I calculated
the difference in emissions from the household’s fleet of vehicles if they were to
participate in the program, compared to if they did not participate. To do this,
I assume that all vehicles are driven an average number of miles; therefore, the
results are solely the difference in fuel efficiency of the new cars compared to their
replacements. To convert the reduction in emission into a dollar value, I use the
social cost of carbon estimates from the EPA during the Obama Administration.
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TABLE 20.
Discounted Increase in Long-Run Output from
Alternative Policies
Credit Restriction Baseline PCA Neural Net
$3,500 18 MPG 3,268 2,576 3,131
$3,500 No Limit 3,044 2,439 3,054
$4,500 18 MPG 2,328 2,476 2,622
$4,500 No Limit 2,711 2,982 2,751
$6,000 18 MPG 2,204 3,447 2,012
$6,000 No Limit 2,560 3,490 2,450
$9,000 18 MPG 3,201 3,843 2,399
$9,000 No Limit 3,133 2,999 2,790
Notes: The table above depicts the discounted change
in long-run output as a result of the proposed programs.
Values are in millions of 2009 dollars.
C02 offsets can be seen in Table 21. Similar to the results from the stimulus, larger
credits result in smaller benefits. The removal of the MPG restriction also reduces
the environmental benefit of the program.
TABLE 21.
CO2 Offsets from Alternative Policies
Credit Restricton Baseline PCA Neural Net
$3,500 18 MPG 262 235 287
$3,500 No Limit 175 137 185
$4,500 18 MPG 187 186 209
$4,500 No Limit 132 131 139
$6,000 18 MPG 134 142 141
$6,000 No Limit 89 100 99
$9,000 18 MPG 78 85 80
$9,000 No Limit 52 56 54
Notes: The table above depicts the total CO2 offsets of
the proposed programs. Values are in millions of 2009
dollars.
By modifying the baseline model to include household demographics, it
allows me to analyze the effect that these counterfactual exercises have on varied
demographic groups. For the remainder of the paper I present just a few of the
analyses that are possible with this modification. The first is what percent of
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participants are male, seen in Table 22. As the size of the credit increased, fewer
males participate in the program. One reason for this may be that, with smaller
credits, only the oldest vehicles are traded-in as part of the program—which are
more likely to be owned by males. A similar explaination would explain why, when
the MPG restriction is removed, fewer males participate.
TABLE 22.
Percent of Male Participants from
Alternative Policies
Credit Restriction PCA Neural Net
$3,500 18 MPG 66.67 58.46
$3,500 No Limit 53.33 56.15
$4,500 18 MPG 51.43 56.64
$4,500 No Limit 47.22 54.07
$6,000 18 MPG 53.26 52.57
$6,000 No Limit 48.43 52.87
$9,000 18 MPG 54.22 49.22
$9,000 No Limit 49.18 49.00
Notes: The table above depicts the percent of
male participants in the proposed programs.
The final proof of concept that I demonstrate is how individual regions of
the country are impacted by the proposed policies. For this analysis, I present the
results from the neural net model in Table 23. The conclusion is that as the size of
the credit increases, the participants shift from the Northeast (the richest region of
the country) to the South (the poorest) and, to a lesser degree, to the West. This
type of analysis could be incredibly useful if policy makers wished to target specific
areas of the country, or aimed policy toward specific demographic groups.
Conclusion
Recently, automobile scrappage subsidies—such as Cash for Clunkers—
have fallen out of favor. This is most likely due to these programs’ relative
ineffectiveness, which is the consensus of the literature. Despite the noble goal
of acting as both an economic stimulus and a method to promote a lower carbon
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TABLE 23.
Region of the Country of Program Participants (Neural Net)
from Alternative Policies
Region
Credit Restriction Northeast Midwest South West
$3,500 18 MPG 36.92 20.00 27.69 15.38
$3,500 No Limit 31.55 14.44 34.76 19.25
$4,500 18 MPG 33.63 16.81 30.97 18.58
$4,500 No Limit 30.23 14.53 35.17 20.06
$6,000 18 MPG 30.43 13.04 36.36 20.16
$6,000 No Limit 27.55 14.36 36.95 21.15
$9,000 18 MPG 22.33 18.78 37.78 21.11
$9,000 No Limit 21.72 19.36 37.05 21.87
Notes: The table above depicts the percent of participants that
live in each region of the country in the proposed programs.
footprint, the application tends to fall short on both fronts when compared to the
associated high cost.
In this paper, I develop a heterogeneous consumer model in which households
optimize over multiple vertically differentiated products. The model is applied to
the U.S. car market using a variety of data sources. Importantly, data from the
Cash for Clunkers program is not used in estimating the model. With the results,
I perform a counterfactual meant to replicate the effects of the Cash for Clunkers
program.
I expand on the current literature by developing a new method for modeling
large amounts of household heterogeneity. Comparing my innovation on modeling
heterogeneity to the previous works evaluating the program at an aggregate level, I
can closely match their qualitative results. By expanding on the current literature,
I not only estimate aggregate effects but also distributional effects. I find that as
the conditions of the program changes, it causes large shifts in what regions of the
country and which demographic groups are affected.
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CHAPTER IV
NEW PRODUCTS AND INNOVATION IN THE SMARTPHONE INDUSTRY
Introduction
Since the introduction of the iPhone by Apple on June 29th, 2007, the
smartphone market as experienced astronomical growth. Since the original iPhone
launched, the smartphone industry has expanded by over four times in terms of
annual units sold, growing to an industry with over $50 billion in yearly sales across
many competing firms.
These devices have become a daily part of our lives. Three of every four
American adults own a smartphone, of which over 94% reported to carry their
smartphone with them frequently, according to the PEW Research Center. Over
this timespan, the phones in our pockets have gotten more and more advanced.
For example, consider that AI assistance in the form of Apple’s Siri and Google’s
assistant, is a standard feature of almost every phone sold today after being
introduced only seven years ago with the iPhone 4s. Consumers have access to
professional level camera replacements in their pockets, and of course the myriad of
apps free available for download.
In a market so large and ubiquitous, surplus is contested for by both
consumers and firms. This constant struggle is exemplified by the rapid pace
of technological improvement exhibited in the market. In this paper, I model
the initial growth in the smartphone market and separately identify the value of
the rise in accessibility, and the value of technological innovation. My findings
determine that considering these two effects in tandem, the consumers have
benefited by $3.5 billion per year or $11.50 per individual per year.
The makeup of the smartphone industry has evolved over years. The market
originated out of the exclusive two-year contract agreements, a remnant of the
“feature phone” era. During this time there were every few options of phones to
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pick from, with the market confined to physical space limitations of the dealership.
The term feature phone originated as a concept of the plans themselves. As
the plan itself was the only differentiated aspect of the bundled purchase, a
phone would be included as part the plan as an additional feature. The modern
smartphones are anything but homogeneous. With extensive coverage chronicling
every imagine adaption.1
Today, consumers have many more options for obtaining access to a
smartphone and the number of phones on the market as exploded. While there are
still dominant brands (Apple, Samsung) the fringe firms provide and an increasing
amount of value to the market. Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) show that capturing the
effect of these fringe firms is vital to obtaining welfare estimates. Greenstein and
Ramey (1998) and Weiss (2003) examine different industrial makeups in vertically
integrated markets to determine when firms have incentive to innovate.
The introduction of new products has a long a recent history. In his study
of minivans, Petrin (2002) finds that the introduction of the vehicle added $500
million in yearly welfare. The analysis presented in this paper expands on the
work done by Petrin. A paper by Crawford et al. (2015) has looked at welfare
effects in a market of substantial size, the cable television market. The smartphone,
unlike the minivan or cable television, has undergone vast technological change
since its introduction. The technological advance of the smartphone has been
on a broad scale, ranging across many attributes (camera, processing power,
resolution, etc.) In studying technological growth, Goettler and Gordon (2011)
allow firms to make strategic decisions about when to release new models when
studying the microprocessor market. However, the authors of this paper boil down
microprocessors to a quality variable in one dimension, and only must consider
the strategic nature of a two-firm market. This approach does not lend itself to
the makeup of the smartphone market. One reason is the top firms release their
1In 2010Q1 there were 74 options while in 2014Q3 consumers had 163 models to choose from.
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flagship devices at the same time every year, implying that that strategic decision
in the smartphone market is degenerate. Another is that the smartphones are
differentiated on more attributes than just speed. Attempting to include all the
different attribute dimensions in a Goettler and Gordon (2011) style model would
soon become untractable.
Instead, I use a modified version of the model from Berry et al. (1995). I can
track technological innovation over the product cycle and obtain welfare estimates
in the smartphone market. Additionally, I can diagnose the value to consumers of
firm competition and of brand loyalty to firms. Using the later to preform welfare
analysis of potential mergers.
What makes this market an important topic of study is primarily its size and
dramatic growth rate. Today, almost every American adult owns a smartphone
(and uses it daily), a device barely a decade old. New devices are repurchased,
on average every 33 months and can cost up to $1000. Over time the prices of
these devices have continued to rise. Even when new products are introduced, the
previous model only see a small, if any, drop in price. This makes the smartphone
market is one of the largest in world. Understanding how this market operates is
not only necessary to accurately regulate the market but can useful to guide a
understanding of the increasingly large and complex digital markets at the center
of today’s economy.
In the next section, I lay out the specifics of the utility specification. In
section three, I discuss the datasets used in estimation. In section four, I present
results.
Discrete Choice
I adopt a random coefficients model from Berry et al. (1995). In models such
as these, individuals receive utility from their purchase decisions. This specification
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can be written in the fashion presented below
uijt = δjt + µijt + ijt. (4.1)
Here, i indexes individuals and j indexes products on the market, and t time. δ
has been separated out as it contains the terms that do not depend on i, that
means that this term (δ) captures aspects of the product that affect all consumers
equally. The term µ is individual specific, capturing individuals’ heterogeneous
preferences. ij is an individual specific error term which is assumed to be
i.i.d. across consumers. The term δ, common to all consumers, can be further
disaggregated
δjt = αpjt +
K∑
k=1
βkxjtk + ξjt (4.2)
Here k indexes product attributes, the product attributes (p, x) are assumed to
enter linearly. α is the marginal utility of income, and β, the marginal utility of one
addition unit of associated attribute. ξ is utility earned from aspects of the product
that are unobserved by the econometrician (but observed by the consumer).
Individuals select the product that gives them the most utility. Assume that the
error term  follow a type 1 extreme value distribution. This assumption allows
market shares (s) to be calculated from the model
sjt =
1
I
∑
I
eδjt+µijt
1 +
∑
j
eδjt+µijt
, (4.3)
where I is the number of consumers. To disentangle the values of α, β from
ξ requires use of appropriate instruments for price. This is because the unobserved
component is expected to be positively correlated with price. In other words, the
econometrician recognizes that there are characteristics that are unobserved to him
but not the consumer which are expected to be positively correlated with price. In
the specific case of no heterogeneity (µijt = 0), the model can be solved analytically.
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If appropriate instruments (Z) are available, the estimates for α, β become,
α, β = (X ′∆X)−1X ′∆δ, (4.4)
where, ∆ = Z(Z ′Z)−1Z ′.
If µijt 6= 0, the model can be solved with a Berry et al. (1995) contraction
map. In practice, I use a modified version proposed by Nevo (2000b). Let µijt have
the form
µijt =
M∑
m=1
vi,mσmxj,m, (4.5)
where, vi,m
i.i.d.∼ N(0, 1), and σm is the standard deviation of consumer preferences
for product attribute m. This specification allows consumers’ preferences to vary
across product attributes but does not allow interactions between attributes. The
Nevo (2000b) contraction map solves for δjt by perfectly matching predicted shares
sijt(x, p, δ, σ, ξ) to shares from the data Sijt, ∀i, j, t for a given set of guesses σ.
Nevo (2000b) suggests updating δijt as follows,
δ′ijt = δijt + ln(Sijt)− ln(sijt(pt, xt, δt, σ)), (4.6)
until convergence.
With this in place, the same first-order condition from before can be applied,
specifically, α, β = (X ′∆X)−1X ′∆δ. From this I can back out the unobserved
product attributes ξ.
ξ = δ − αp−Xβ. (4.7)
All that is left is to solve for σ. The solution to sigma, is to find the set of value
that minimize the sum off the errors from the above process. This amounts to
solving the minimization problem,
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min
σ
ξ′Ψξ (4.8)
where Ψ is an appropriate weighting matrix.
It is possible to simultaneously estimate the supply side of the market.
This requires solving the first-order condition resulting from the firm’s profit
maximization problem.
max Πf =
∑
j∈Jf
(pj −mcj)sj(p,X, ξ) (4.9)
where, f indexes firms, and Jf the suite of products offered by firm f . If we assume
a linear system for marginal cost, i.e,
mcj = wjγ + ωj (4.10)
where wj are product observables that impact marginal cost, γ are parameters
to be estimates, and ω is an error term (which is possibly correlated with price.)
Solving the first-order condition gives the following relation,
p− Γ(p,X, ξ)−1s(p,X, ξ) = wγ + ω (4.11)
where Γlj =
−∂sl
∂pj
if product l and j are produced by the same firm, zero otherwise.
The benefits of estimating the supply side are that it allows the potential to
estimate efficiency gains due to economies of scales when considering potential
mergers. Additionally, there can be efficiency gains in the estimation regarding
the standard errors of demand side instruments.
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Welfare
With estimates in hand, the model lends itself quite nicely to welfare
calculations. From Zhao et al. (2008), the welfare given a specific option set is
E(Max(Uijt, ∀j)) = ln
∑
j
eVijt (4.12)
This can be used to calculate the improvement in welfare when the set of options
expands
E
(
Max(Uijt)−Max(U˜ijt)
)
= ln
∑
j
eVijt − ln
∑
j
eV˜ijt (4.13)
Finally, the compensating variation can be obtained by scaling the previous
result by the marginal utility of income. This provides a monetary figure that is
equivalent to the loss in utility the individual would sustain, were the choice set
varied from V → V˜ .
E(CVit) = − 1
α + σαviα
(
ln
∑
j
eVijt − ln
∑
j
eV˜ijt
)
(4.14)
Mergers
This model can be used to examine welfare applications from proposed
mergers. There are a few common methods for evaluating mergers in the literature.
One such method is used by Nevo (2000a) and Petrin (2002). The simulation uses
demand estimates from the original estimation to calculate post-merger outcomes.
Another, developed by Morrow and Skerlos (2011) iterates over the markup
equation to solve for post-merger shares. Either method allows me to back out on
estimate of the effect on price. Using these estimates, I can calculate the effect on
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), consumer surplus and producer surplus.
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Data
The data in this analysis is provided by the Internation Data Corporation
(IDC). The data is the US subset of their Worldwide Quarterly Mobile Phone
Tracker. The sample ranges from the first quarter of 2007 to the third quarter
of 2014. Over this time-period I have market level data on the price and amount
of sales of all phones sold in the US at the quarterly frequency. In addition to
market values, the dataset has a select number of product attributes on the phones,
such as screen size, network connectivity, etc. However, the attribute data is only
available for smartphones sold in or after 2010Q1. Due to the lack of data on all
phones pre-2010, and feature phones thereafter, I have restricted my analysis to
just the smartphone market for the years which I have detailed data. The data
from 2007Q1-2009Q4 account for 40% of the observations, 39% of the sales, and
16% of the revenue from overall dataset. The feature phones from 2010Q1-2014Q3
account for 25% of observations, 22% of sales, and 5% of total revenue. In addition
to the product data provided by IDC, I acquired additional data on smartphone
models from gsmarena.com. The data I collected is on battery life and physical
specifications.
Selection Criteria
An important descriptor of phones in the US market is their availability at
the major carriers. The four primary carriers are Verizon, AT&T, Sprint and T-
Mobile. The observation of carrier availability is an important factor in determining
the appropriate market for the phone. However, the dataset used in this study only
has aggregate sales. On top of that, carrier information is not provided. There are
a few possible solutions to this problem, on which I elaborate later. In this section I
propose a basic solution.
Most phones are requisitioned for a specific carrier (exclusive) or have general
availability and are stocked by all major carriers. Since I cannot determine the
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specific phones or market sizes for exclusive phones, I instead focus on the generally
available phones. By implementing a selection criterion, I aim to isolate the sample
of phones that are universally available. Phones that are stocked by all carriers
have a larger reach and should ship in larger quantities. The selection criteria I
use is based off that idea. I select a subsample of phones that satisfy the following
criteria:
∑
t
UjtNt
Ut
> 4 where Ut =
J∑
j=1
Ujt. (4.15)
In the above, Ujt is the number of units sold by product j in quarter t and Nt
is the number of products on the market in quarter t. I selected this criteria over a
purely unit sold measure to make the criteria invariant to the growing market. In
other words, the aggregate market sales for a phone must be above the expected
average over the time-period for which the phone was on the market. The cutoff
of 4 comes from Table 24 below, which shows that the average phone spends 366
days (4 quarters) on the market. The high cutoff is due to the preference to reduce
the likelihood of a type II error (failing to omit an exclusive phone) over a type I
error (rejecting a universal phone.) The downfall is that the remaining sample will
only be of popular universal phones. When presenting results, I perform sensitivity
analysis to the selection criteria. Below are some summary statistics for the dataset
containing all smartphone and the subsample based off of the selection criteria.2
Summary Statistics
Table 24 provides the summary statistics for both the entire smartphone
market, and the subsample generated by the selection criteria.
The data for this analysis is specific to the phones and the amount of sales
from the perspective of the firm. The firm in this case being the company that
2This is common practice in the sabermetric community to control for player performance
across era. Source: https://www.fangraphs.com/library/offense/wrc/
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TABLE 24.
IDC Data Summary Statistics
Complete Selection Criteria
Variable Mean Std Mean Std
Price ($) 339 152 427 167
Units Sold (Thousands) 241 629 814 1263
Time on Market (Days) 366 204 587 229
Camera (Megapixels) 5.74 3.05 6.00 3.10
Memory (Gigabytes) 7.64 13.6 12.7 15.7
Thickness (Millimeters) 11.8 3.79 11.4 2.35
Weight (Grams) 137 25.0 136 21.8
Battery Life (Hours) 9.19 5.62 8.56 4.55
Battery Capacity (Milliampere Hours) 1729 526 1677 495
Screen Coverage (% of Face) 54.9 11.7 55.1 13.1
Processor Speed (GHz) 1.19 0.37 1.16 0.38
Number of Cores 1.81 1.17 1.65 0.97
N 2244 - 403 -
Number of Models 528 - 51 -
Number of Firms 30 - 8 -
T = 19. The average price of a purchased phone from the entire dataset was
$456 while it was $526 in the subsample.
produces the phone (e.g. Apple, Samsung, etc.) In the United States, phones are
generally purchased congruently with an access plan from a major provider (e.g.
Verizon Wireless, Sprint, etc.)
Market History
While the smartphone market has 30 different firms contributing products,
the market is dominated by only two firms. Apple accounts for 45.4% of the total
revenue of the market, while Samsung accounts for 24%, or 43.9% of the remaining
market. However, this was not always the case, in Figure 9 below, we see that at
the beginning of the sample, BlackBerry began hemorrhaging its market share.
The Samsung we know today, Apple’s prime competitor, was not always a foregone
conclusion. Throughout 2010 and most of 2011, Samsung was in a fierce fight with
HTC for their market position. Only with the success of the Galaxy S line was
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Samsung able to position itself as the number two player in the market. Since 2012,
there has not been any substantial movement in market shares of the top firms.
FIGURE 9.
Revenue Weighted Market Shares
Most sales for both Apple and Samsung come from their flagship line, the
iPhone and Galaxy S, respectively. The two product lines are remarkably similar.
Both products have a distinct product cycle lasting about three years. Both see
immediate and sustained high sales upon introduction, only to experience a drop-
off with the introduction of the next model. The only exception to this is the
iPhone 4s, which sold considerably well after the introduction of the iPhone 5. One
possible explanation for this is that the iPhone 4s was the first model to come with
Siri voice assistant. Since their introduction, both lines have been refreshed about
once per year. As the dominant firm, Apple chooses to introduce their new iPhone
in the fall, during the height of shopping season, while Samsung releases their new
Galaxy S phone separated by almost exactly 6 months. Figure 10 visualizes the
product life cycle of the iPhone and Galaxy S lines.
With every new product, the producers iterate and improve on their design.
This does not always happen in every dimension, for example, the iPhone 4s
increased the megapixels in the camera over the previous iteration, however it
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FIGURE 10.
Product Life Cycle of Popular Products
(a) iPhone
Product Cycle
(b) Galaxy S
Product Cycle
Notes: Data from the Internation Data Corporation, 2010Q1-2014Q3.
made no improvements on the thickness of the device. The general trend among
characteristics is always towards better components. I present the trend for camera
quality and thickness (Figure 11). In these diagrams, the value for any singe
quarter is the average of phones sold specifically in the quarter, rather than the
average of all devices in the hands of consumers at that point in time. Recall from
Figure 9, we saw the market shares of the leading firms had remained constant over
the past three years. Despite constant market shares, the market has continued to
evolve in the form of technological advance. For welfare estimates to be precise,
the model must be able to accurately measure the value that these continued
improvements bring to consumers.
Results
In this section I present my findings. Prior to the final results, I discuss
the different instruments available and their relative benefits. Upon arriving at
the optimal combination of controls and instruments, I present the results in the
context of a model with homogeneous consumers, and one of random coefficient. I
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FIGURE 11.
Evolution of Camera Quality and Thickness
(a) Improvement in
Camera Quality
(b) Reduction in
Phone Thickness
Notes: Data from the Internation Data Corporation, 2010Q1-2014Q3.
find that there is quite a large different in welfare effects, dependent on if consumer
heterogeneity is included in the model.
As I have previously discussed, the general form of the model is
uijt = (α + σαviα)pjt + x
′
jtβ¯ +
∑
k
σkvikxjkt + ξjt + ijt (4.16)
when the heterogenous terms are ignored, this can be solved analytically for shares.
ln(Sharejt)− ln(Outside Sharet) = αpjt +
J∑
j=1
βjxjt + ejt (4.17)
Note that the right-hand side is a linear system. The two variables on the left
side are reported in the data, this can be solved analytically using the relevant
explanatory variables and appropriate instruments for price. I focus on a set of
demand side variables in the analysis
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– Time on Market: The amount of time, in quarters, the phone has been on
market. A just released phone takes a value of zero. The longer a phone is on
the market the lower its sales are expected to be.
– ln(Storage Space): The amount of files and/or media that can be stored on
the device. It is expected that larger capacities are sought after.
– ln(Camera Quality): A portable camera is one of the most sought after
features of the smartphone. As such, better qualities (measures in
megapixels) should have a larger coefficient estimate.
For the supply side of the model I include a set of variables that might have
an impact on the marginal cost of the individual units.
– ln(Storage Space): It is expected that larger capacities increase the
production cost.
– ln(Camera Quality): Shipping phones with better cameras should increase the
cost of production.
– Time Trend: It is reasonable to expect the production process to be improved
upon over time. The time trend should have a negative estimate.
The above are not the only explanatory variables used in the model. The
relevant control variables are included as well. In my analysis, I control for
time with quarterly dummies on demand and firm dummy variables on both
supply and demand. A more detailed analysis of these controls can be found in
Appendix B. While other explanatory variables were considered, the degree of
collinearity between alternative attributes and those listed above made included
them unrealistic. The following is a discussion of the potential instruments used in
my analysis.
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Instruments
In this section, I discuss the options available to instrument for price and
the choice ultimately adopted. Commonly in this line of literature, authors use
instruments with the purpose of capturing how “far” a product is from its nearest
competitors as defined by the product space. Examples of these would be the
original instruments from Berry et al. (1995) or differentiation IVs developed by
Gandhi and Houde (2016). Berry et al. (1995) accomplished this by aggregating
values of product characteristics differentiated by offering from the same firm,
then by the competitions’ products. Gandhi and Houde (2016) proposes two sets of
instruments. Like Berry et al. (1995), the differentiation IVs considers each product
attribute in isolation. The first is a measure of the number of other products on
the market within one standard deviation in the specific attribute. The second
is a summation of all second-order polynomials between the product and others
on the market. If desired, this second set of instruments can extended beyond a
single attribute by considering the second-order interaction among attributes. In
my analysis, I use the instruments proposed by BLP. More details on this choice
can be found in Appendix B.
Findings
It been shown that even in the absence of average value for an attribute it
is possible to obtain a measure of the spread of preference for that attribute. The
basis for this is by extracting the information contained in a products’ sales relative
to that of product space over time. Putting together all of the pieces I present the
estimates for the full model in Table 25.
Here the coefficient on price (α) is appropriately negative although still
insignificant at conventional levels. Many of the other variable have the expected
sign as well. The coefficient on the time since release is substantially negative,
implying the individuals strongly prefer newer phones. The storage capacity does
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seem to favor larger capacities, if only slightly. This is an improvement over the
previous models. Finally, the preference for camera quality is also stronger under
the full specification.
TABLE 25.
Comparison of Estimates from Various Specifications
Demand Estimates OLS IV Full
Price 0.213 -6.07 -11.6
(0.845) (0.337) (0.184)
Time on Market (Quarters) -0.230 -0.278 -0.319
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Gigabytes of Memory) -0.096 0.065 0.331
(0.332) (0.762) (0.127)
Log(Megapixels on Camera) 0.971 1.82 2.59
(0.016) (0.030) (0.031)
Supply Estimates
Log(Gigabytes of Memory) 0.027
(0.000)
Log(Megapixels on Camera) 0.167
(0.000)
Trend -0.016
(0.000)
Quarter (Demand) X X X
Firm (Demand and Supply) X X X
R2 0.415 0.315 —
p-values are reported in parentheses. p-values are
generated using heteroskedastic robust standard errors
and are clustered at the quarterly level. Estimates
significant at the 5% level are in bold. BLP instruments
are used. N = 403.
Welfare
The goal of this exercise is to determine a welfare value of all phones in
the market by time-period. These estimates provide context into the scale of the
market and from that the importance of relevant policy measures. Using these
estimates, I can calculate the level of compensating variation. Figure 12 gives a
time-series representation of the welfare added each period.
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FIGURE 12.
Estimates for Compensating Variation
(a) IV Model (b) Full Model
Notice the stark differences between the two models. While the shape is the
same, the full model estimates consumer surplus over 100% larger. The returns to
the consumer in the model where only demand was estimated were $5 per consumer
per year. In the model with supply side estimates, consumers benefited by $11.50
per consumer per year. Aggregated over the population, the benefit exceeds $3
billion annually.
Merger Analysis
With a fully solved random coefficients model, I can perform counterfactuals
such as proposed mergers. I propose two potential mergers. The first is an
acquisition of Motorola by Samsung. The second is a merging of Motorola and
LG Electronics, the third and fourth largest firms of the time, respectively. Both
analyses assume the merger takes place at the end the second quarter of 2013. The
first result of note is the effect on market concentration. In the quarters after the
mergers, the HHI increased by over 500 on average in the case of merger 1. The
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result of the second merger is more tempered, with an increase of just over 100.
These effects can be seen in Figure 13.
FIGURE 13.
Estimates for Changes in HHI and Consumer Surplus from Mergers
(a) Change in HHI (b) Change in CS
Similarly, the decline in consumer surplus is substantially larger when
considering merger 1. Evidenced in Figure 13, the first merger hurts the average
consumer by about $0.15 over the remaining sample period. When factoring in
gains from the producers, the overall welfare of the market would have decreased
by $38 million because of an acquisition of Motorola via Samsung in the summer
of 2013. The merger in question would have consolidated power in a market that
is already dominated by two firms. It should not be surprising that this proposed
merger would have drastically decreased welfare. The second of the two proposals
would have created a potential potent third player. Due to neither Motorola nor
LG being prominent players, the negative effects of the proposal are significantly
lower. The second proposed merger would have reduced total surplus by $6 million.
91
Conclusion
While the previous literature has long had the tools available to perform
welfare analysis, such projects are rarely undertaken in markets of substantial
size. Of which the smartphone market is one of the largest. In this paper, I apply
a random coefficient model of heterogeneous demand to data provided by the
IDC. One of the most problematic features of this market is an incredible strong
preference for expensive phones, to the extent where consumers are seemingly
ambivalent to price. In my analysis, I instrument price and make good use of
controls to break through the strong upward trend on prices.
I find that the market has provided over $860 billion in surplus to the
consumers, over half of that coming from the two largest firms Apple, and
Samsung. While there have not been any significant shifts in market share over
the later parts of the sample period, it is not to say that there have not been
attempts. Some of the largest players in the tech industry have tried to break into
the smartphone market. Recently Google has made another push into the market
with the acquisition of HTC after their failed bid to revitalize Motorola.34 The
market could be further limited by policies that have the potential to reduce foreign
involvement, such as the Commerce Departments ban on ZTE, or the Intelligence
Department Vendetta on Huawei. 56 In a market what such a large chunk goes to
only two firms, any move towards consolidation should be met with a skeptical eye.
Using the model presented, it is possible to conduct welfare considerations of any
proposed merger.
3Epstein (2014)
4Russell (2018)
5Freifeld (2018)
6Cheng (2018)
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
I use a variety of structural modeling techniques to provide insight on
differing markets with an eye toward the role that consumer heterogeneity plays
in those markets.
In Chapter II, we consider the U.S. automobile industry. We write down
a dynamic model of vertical quality differentiation. In our model, consumers
optimally choose what types of vehicles to purchase, and how long to own those
vehicles. This innovation is substantial, because previous studies that use dynamic
models to study the industry do not allow for differentiation in the type of vehicles.
We can more precisely estimate the effect of the Cash for Clunkers program. We do
this by noting that the program incentivized households to trade-in fuel-inefficient
trucks for newer fuel-efficient cars. By exploiting the differentiation between cars
are trucks, we estimate that the benefit of CO2 offsets achieved by the program are
larger than the conclusion of the rest of the literature. Additionally, we find that
if the level of the maximum credit offered to households had been set at $2,500
instead of $4,500, the environmental benefit associated with C02 offsets would have
been 88% larger. While the distinction between car and trucks led to increased
environmental benefits, by forcing this substitution, the program reduced its desired
effect on economic stimulus. This is because the trucks that households substituted
away from are typically more expensive than their sedan counterparts.
In Chapter III, I continue to examine the Cash for Clunkers program and
the U.S. automobile industry. The analysis in Chapter II did not lend itself to
incorporating the microlevel data that is available from the CEX. In Chapter
III, I propose new methods to analyze the data. The proposed methods use ML
techniques to compact the size of the data-space so that estimates can be obtained
with standard computational methods. I focus on two different techniques,
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principle component analysis, and the use of a neural network. Using the methods
presented in Chapter III I can trace the effects of the Cash for Clunkers program
to which demographic groups it affected. Likewise, I can follow the same procedure
to determine which groups were affected by numerous counterfactual exercises. The
primary benefit of this research is that it would allow policy makers to implement a
program nationwide while targeting specific groups of individuals or regions of the
country.
Finally, in Chapter IV, I consider the smartphone industry, which has seen
unprecedented growth in recent years. This industry is already very concentrated,
with very few firms controlling a significant portion of the market. This is
worrisome because consumers can be negatively impacted because of severe market
concentration. With large tech firms continuing to acquire start-ups at a furious
pace, it become necessary to understand these industries to appropriately analyze
anti-trust concerns. In my analysis, I estimate a random coefficients model to
capture the effect of technological increases as well as characterize the state of the
industry. I find that, on average, the American consumer benefits by $11.50 per
year from technological advancements in the industry from 2010-2014. Regarding
anti-trust concerns, I preform hypothetical merger analysis. I find that even
when considering the merging of non-dominant firms, the costs of consumers
far outweighs the gains from economies of scale. Like the other chapters of my
dissertation, I show that if the researcher does not include consumer heterogeneity
in the analysis, that the estimates obtained are substantially ill-informed.
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APPENDIX A
DECISION RULES FOR TWO-VEHICLE HOUSEHOLDS
Presented below is the closed form steady-state value of a two-vehicles
households ofr a given combination of a, n, and m.
V2(y, γ, α, a, n,m) =
1
1− βn−a+1
[ [
γ(qa + αqa+m) + ln(y − pa + Ψ(pn)− C2)
]
+
n−m∑
j=1
βj
[
γ(qa+j + αqm+j) + ln(y − C2)
]
+ βn−m+1
[
γ(qa + αqa+n−m+1) + ln(y − pa + Ψ(pn)− C2)
]
+
n−a∑
j=n−m+2
βj
[
γ(qa+1+j−n+m−2 + αqa+j) + ln(y − C2)
] ]
.
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APPENDIX B
CONTROLS AND INSTRUMENTS
Controls
An important part of any economic analysis is careful consideration of the
control variables that go into the model. Table A1 below documents an extensive
list of potential control variables. The results in this table are from running a
BLP style regression on shares where price is instrumented for with the BLP
instruments. A detailed discussion on the choice of instrument can be found later in
the appendix.
The first column shows what the estimate would like with a complete lack of
fixed effects. The second column only controls for the changing landscape of the
market over time. Moving down the list increases the scale of the model’s fixed
effects. Firm fixed effects are added to control for differences in popularity across
firms. This is necessitated by the perception that consumer have about different
brands. A phone offered by ZTE would not be expected to sell as well as a phone
with the same internal and external attributes offered by Apple. Some of this effect
is due to advertising while some are unobserved qualities of the phone, such as
customer service. The unobserved effects constant across all phones from a single
provider are incorporated into the firm fixed effects.
When all this is put together, the final model had the only negative price
coefficient among the specifications. While the coefficient is not significant, this is
the only the results from the homogeneous version of the model. In the main body
of the paper, I discuss the role that heterogeneity plays in the estimation of this
model.
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TABLE A1.
Comparison of Controls
Demand Estimates None Quarter Firm
Price 0.918 0.768 -11.6
(0.208) (0.552) (0.184)
Time on Market (Quarters) -0.150 -0.174 -0.319
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Gigabytes of Memory) -0.109 -0.051 0.331
(0.067) (0.539) (0.127)
Log(Megapixels on Camera) -0.027 -0.176 2.59
(0.889) (0.360) (0.031)
Supply Estimates
Log(Gigabytes of Memory) 0.028 0.032 0.027
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Megapixels on Camera) -0.033 -0.039 0.167
(0.006) (0.028) (0.000)
Trend 0.002 0.002 -0.016
(0.387) (0.457) (0.000)
Quarter (Demand) X X
Firm (Demand and Supply) X
p-values are reported in parentheses. p-values are generated
using heteroskedastic robust standard errors and are
clustered at the quarterly level. Estimates significant at
the 5% level are in bold. BLP instruments are used. N =
403.
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Instruments
In this section, I discuss the options for instruments available and the
choice ultimately adopted. Commonly in this line of literature, authors use
instruments with the purpose of capturing how “far” a product is from its nearest
competitors as defined by the product space. Examples of these would be the
original instruments from Berry et al. (1995) or differentiation IVs developed by
Gandhi and Houde (2016). Berry et al. (1995) accomplished this by aggregating
values of product characteristics differentiated by offering from the same firm,
then by the competitions’ products. Gandhi and Houde (2016) proposes two sets of
instruments. Like Berry et al. (1995), the differentiation IVs considers each product
attribute in isolation. The first is a measure of the number of other products on
the market within one standard deviation in the specific attribute. The second is
a summation of all second-order polynomials between the product and others on
the market. If desired, this second set of instruments can extended beyond a single
attribute by considering the second-order interaction among attributes.
Table A2 compares the results of an instrumental variable regression using the
different instruments discussed in this section. As you can see, the differentiation
instruments moved the estimate on price into the positive region. The standard
BLP instruments were the only instruments with enough power to move the
coefficient on price into an economically sensible region.
Investigation of the Selection Criteria
In Table A3 below I present the results of varying the selection criteria. I
inquire as to the effects of lowering the threshold from 4 to 2, 1 and 0 (the full
sample), as well as an alternative rule for sampling, based off units sold.
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TABLE A2.
Investigation of Potential Instruments
Demand Estimates 1st 2nd BLP
Price 5.48 -8.21 -11.6
(0.224) (0.716) (0.184)
Time on Market (Quarters) -0.167 -0.224 -0.319
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Gigabytes of Memory) -0.187 -0.048 0.331
(0.125) (0.696) (0.127)
Log(Megapixels on Camera) 0.296 1.55 2.59
(0.583) (0.028) (0.031)
Supply Estimates
Log(Gigabytes of Memory) 0.030 1.32 0.027
(0.012) (0.974) (0.000)
Log(Megapixels on Camera) -0.204 -5.13 0.167
(0.002) (0.978) (0.000)
Trend -0.021 0.079 -0.016
(0.015) (0.989) (0.000)
p-values are reported in parentheses. p-values are
generated using heteroskedastic robust standard errors
and are clustered at the quarterly level. Estimates
significant at the 5% level are in bold. Time and firm
level fixed effects are used. N = 403.
TABLE A3.
Alternative Selection Criteria
Invariant Criteria (Cutoff) Sales Criteria (Units)
Full Sample (1) (2) (4) (250000) (1000000)
Price 7.74 0.549 3.20 -7.32 -1.48 -1.94
(0.220) (0.911) (0.298) (0.281) (0.676) (0.533)
Time on Market -0.207 -0.246 -0.241 -0.282 -0.248 -0.250
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(Memory) -0.228 -0.022 -0.109 0.128 0.054 0.033
(0.244) (0.900) (0.407) (0.597) (0.671) (0.802)
Log(Megapixels) -0.585 0.295 0.140 2.07 0.493 1.16
(0.451) (0.591) (0.627) (0.021) (0.218) (0.000)
R2 0.363 0.396 0.4072 0.288 0.383 0.426
N 2214 1568 961 403 1614 668
p-values are reported in parentheses. p-values are generated using heteroskedastic
robust standard errors and are clustered at the quarterly level. Estimates significant at
the 5% level are in bold. Quarter and firm fixed effects are used. Price is instrumented
with BLP instruments.
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